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A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY STUDENTS’
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Elizabeth A. Shaver*
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the federal appellate courts have grappled with
the issue whether, and to what extent, school officials constitutionally may
discipline students for their off-campus speech. Before 2015, three federal
circuit courts had extended school authority to off-campus electronic
speech by applying a vague test that allows school officials to reach far
beyond the iconic “schoolhouse gate” referenced in the Supreme Court’s
1969 landmark decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District. 1 Two other federal circuits had avoided the issue
altogether by deciding the cases before them on other grounds.
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the sixth circuit
court to wrestle with the issue. In August 2015, the Fifth Circuit issued an
en banc ruling in which multiple judges urged the Supreme Court to
provide guidance regarding the scope of school discipline over students’
off-campus speech. 2 When a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed in
the Fifth Circuit case, 3 it seemed possible that the Supreme Court indeed
would provide the guidance desperately needed by the lower courts.
However, on February 29, 2016, just days after the unexpected death of
Justice Antonin Scalia, 4 the Supreme Court denied the petition that had
been filed in the Fifth Circuit case. 5 The eight-member Court thus missed
an opportunity to address this important First Amendment issue.
This article reviews the varied approaches the federal circuits have
taken regarding the scope of school officials’ authority to discipline
students for electronic speech that is created and distributed outside of
school. The article then proposes an analytical framework that, building
on Supreme Court precedent, protects students’ free speech rights while
preserving the ability of school officials to insure the safety and wellbeing
of the school community.
*
Associate Professor of Legal Writing, The University of Akron School of Law. As
always, many thanks to Phil Carino for his assistance.
1
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 779 F.3d 379, 433 (5th Cir. 2015) (Prado, J.,
dissenting) (“I hope that the Supreme Court soon will give courts the necessary guidance
to resolve these difficult cases”); 779 F.3d at 403 (Costa, J., Owen, J. and Higginson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]his court or the higher one will need to provide clear guidance for
students, teachers and school administrators”).
3
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-666,
2015 WL 7299351 (U.S.) (filed Nov. 17, 2015).
4
Justice Scalia died unexpectedly on February 13, 2016. See Adam Liptak, “Antonin
Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79,” N.Y. Times (Feb. 13, 2016)
(available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r= 0)
(last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
5
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S.Ct. 1166 (2016).
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Part I of this article examines the Supreme Court’s student speech
precedents, none of which involved student off-campus electronic speech.
Part II of the article then reviews the decisions in which the circuit courts
have sought to apply the Supreme Court’s precedents to determine the
scope of school authority over students’ off-campus electronic speech. Part
III examines the views of legal scholars on these issues and proposes a
framework designed to both protect students’ First Amendment rights and
preserve the ability of school officials to ensure the safety and wellbeing
of all individuals in the school community.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S STUDENT SPEECH CASES.

A. The Supreme Court First Addresses the Scope of Students’ First
Amendment Speech Rights While at School.
The Supreme Court has decided four student speech cases. 6
Although none of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases involved
electronic off-campus speech, the decisions nonetheless provide an
analytical framework that can be applied to student speech in the digital
age. 7
Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of students’ First Amendment rights while at school. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 8several students sued
their local school district after they were suspended from school for
wearing black armbands as a protest against the Vietnam War. 9 The Court
found that the disciplinary measures had violated the students’ First
Amendment rights. 10
In so holding, the Court affirmed that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.” 11 Yet the Court also recognized that First Amendment rights were
to be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.” 12 In the Court’s view, the school setting involves
countervailing considerations that must be balanced. On the one hand, as
6
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
7
See Part III, infra.
8
393 U.S. 503.
9
Id. at 504. The plan to wear black armbands as a protest of the Vietnam War arose
out of a meeting of adults and students held at the home of one of the plaintiffs in the
case. This plan was communicated to the principals of the Des Moines school, who
adopted a policy prohibiting the wearing of black armbands at school and authorizing the
suspension of any student who refused to remove a black armband. Id. The plaintiffs in
the case were aware of the newly-instituted policy before the day that they wore black
armbands to school. Id. In accordance with the school policy, they were suspended until
they returned to school without black armbands. Id.
10
Id. at 514. The Court found that the act of wearing black armbands constituted
symbolic speech that was entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 505-06.
11
Id. at 506.
12
Id.
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institutions that “educat[e] the young for citizenship,” 13 schools should not
act in a manner that would “strangle the free mind” 14 or otherwise “teach
youth to discount important principles of our government” 15 such as the
right to freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Court recognized
the “comprehensive authority” 16 of school officials to maintain order at
school. School officials must have the ability to “prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.” 17
To balance these competing concerns, the Court held that school
officials constitutionally may discipline students for speech that
“materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and discipline” 18 of
school. The Court also explained that school officials need not wait for an
actual disruption to occur at school, so long as school officials reasonably
could forecast a future substantial disruption. 19 The Court cautioned that
any such forecast could not be based on either “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension” 20 or a “desire to avoid this discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.” 21
On the facts before it, the Court found that school officials had
acted not to avoid a substantial disruption at school, but simply to avoid
discussion of the merits of the Vietnam War. The Court noted that the
school policy had “singled out for prohibition” 22 the wearing of black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War, not any other symbols that might be
politically controversial. 23 The Court held that a ban on the expression of
one particular position was not constitutionally permissible in the absence
of any evidence that the ban was necessary to avoid substantial
interference with the school setting. 24
While articulating a “substantial interference” or “substantial
disruption” standard by which to examine the constitutionality of school
discipline, the decision in Tinker was not necessarily the model of clarity.
First, the Court did not clearly define what constitutes the “work” or
“discipline” of school. In addition, the Court did not clearly articulate the
facts or factors that cause a disruption of the school environment to be
“substantial” or “material.” 25 The Court also indicated that discipline
might be appropriate if a student’s speech “intrude[d],” 26 “impinge[d],” 27
13

Id. at 507.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 513.
19
Id. at 514.
20
Id. at 508.
21
Id. at 509.
22
Id. at 510.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
The Court used different terminology in different sections of the opinion, referring
to both “substantial disorder” and a “material disrupt[ion of] classwork” as
constitutionally permissible grounds for discipline. Id. at 513.
26
Id. at 508.
27
Id. at 509.
14
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“inva[ded],” 28 or “collid[ed] with” 29 the rights of other students, although
the Court did not illustrate when such a circumstance might occur.
In reviewing the specific facts, the Court noted that the plaintiffs’
act of wearing armbands had not been accompanied by any “disorder or
disturbance” 30 on the part of the plaintiffs. The Court also maintained that
there had been no evidence presented that any class was disrupted by the
wearing of the armbands. 31 The Court further stated: “[o]utside the
classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children wearing
armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school
premises.” 32
Justice Hugo Black dissented from the decision in Tinker. 33 He
principally took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the students’
symbolic speech had not interfered with schoolwork. While
acknowledging that the wearing of black armbands had not prompted
“obscene remarks or boisterous or loud disorder,” Justice Black argued
that school officials were justified in disciplining the students because their
speech had “diverted” other students’ attention from their classwork. 34 He
opined that students could be disciplined for any speech that would cause
other students to take their minds off of their schoolwork. 35 Any diversion
from assigned classwork would be sufficient to allow school officials to
regulate or discipline of student speech. Thus, the definition of a
substantial disruption was a somewhat disputed issue among the members
of the Court.
In addition to being somewhat vague about the contours of a
substantial disruption, the decision in Tinker also was unclear as to the
proper scope or definition of the “school environment,” 36 a highly relevant
question when considering student speech in the digital age. While the
Court did use the clear image of a physical location – the space located
within the “schoolhouse gate” 37 – it also broadened the scope of the ruling
beyond the four corners of a classroom. The Court stated that its ruling
was not limited to “supervised or ordained discussion which takes places
in the classroom,” 38 but that students retained their First Amendment
rights, consistent standards articulated, to express an opinion whether “in
the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
28

Id. at 513.
Id.
30
Id. at 508.
31
Id. The majority stated that no class had been disrupted in spite of evidence
apparently in the record that a mathematics class had been “wrecked” by an in-class
dispute with one of the students wearing a black armband. Id. at 517 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
32
Id. at 508.
33
Id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
34
Id. at 518.
35
Id. (“And I repeat that if the time has come when pupils of state-supported
schools, kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and flout orders of
school officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new
revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary.”).
36
Id. at 506.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 512.
29
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authorized hours.” 39 Yet, in another sentence, the Court stated that school
officials have authority to regulate student speech, whether it takes place
“in class or out of it,” 40 if the speech creates a substantial interference or
disruption.
Of course, the Court cannot be faulted for not anticipating the
digital age when it decided Tinker. Yet, when the lower federal courts
seek to determine the scope of school authority over student electronic
speech that is created and distributed outside of school, some courts have
resorted to reading the “tea leaves” of these particular statements in Tinker
in an attempt to define what it means to be at school.
Although the Court in Tinker used both the words “interference”
and “disruption” to describe the effect of student speech on the school
environment, the standard articulated in Tinker has become known as the
“substantial disruption” standard. Since Tinker, the Court has never
explicitly outlined the contours of the substantial disruption standard or
otherwise clearly defined the phrase “substantial disruption.” 41
B. The Court Determines That Students May Be Disciplined For Lewd or
Obscene Speech That Is Uttered At School.
More than fifteen year after Tinker, the Court again addressed the
issue of students’ First Amendment rights. In Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser, a young man filed suit alleging that school officials had
violated his First Amendment rights by disciplining him for giving a
speech at a school assembly that had been replete with sexual metaphor. 42
The school had determined that the student’s conduct violated the school’s
code of conduct, which used the language of Tinker in prohibiting any
conduct that “materially and substantially interfere[d] with the educational
process, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” 43
The student prevailed both at the trial court and appellate level; both
courts found that the school’s code of conduct was unconstitutionally
vague and that the student’s speech had not caused a substantial disruption
at school as required by Tinker. 44 The Supreme Court reversed. 45
The Court first distinguished the sexually-charged speech in Fraser
from the black armbands of Tinker, stating that the students in Tinker had
not “intrude[d] upon the work of the school[] or the rights of other
students.” 46 The Court then expanded upon Tinker’s concept of the
“work” of public schools, opining a “highly appropriate function of public
school education [is] to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in
39

Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 513.
41
See Lisa Smith-Butler, Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies’ Free
Speech Rights Against the Rights of the Rights of Victims to Be Left Alone When
Regulating Off- Campus K-12 Student Cyberspeech, 37 NOVA L. REV. 243, 303 (2013).
42
478 U.S. 675.
43
Id. at 678.
44
Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9 th Cir. 1985).
45
478 U.S. 675.
46
Id. at 680.
40

6

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

[]

public discourse.” 47 Noting that students’ First Amendment rights are not
“coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” the Court found
that students do not have the same freedom in terms of their choice of
words when expressing their opinion. 48 While an adult in a public place
has the right to choose lewd or obscene language to express a particular
viewpoint, students are not permitted the “same latitude” when at school. 49
Rather, a student’s “freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial
views in schools and classrooms” 50 was tempered by “society’s
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.” 51 Thus, the Court held that the First Amendment
allows school officials to discipline students for lewd or obscene speech
that “undermine[s] the school’s basic educational mission.” 52
In concurring with the decision in Fraser, Justice Brennan made
the significant point that the Court’s decision was limited to lewd speech
uttered at school. He stated that “had [the student] given the same speech
outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized
simply because government officials considered his language to be
inappropriate.” 53 In so stating, Justice Brennan affirmed the view of many
lower courts that students can freely use lewd or obscene speech when not
at school. 54
In addition, Justice Brennan repeatedly invoked the substantial
disruption standard of Tinker, characterizing both the language itself and
its effect on the school environment as “disruptive.” 55 Specifically, Justice
Brennan stated that the school officials had sought to ensure that the
assembly “proceed[ed] in an orderly manner” 56 and that the discipline had
been imposed because the student’s speech “disrupted the school’s
educational process.” 57 Thus, according to Justice Brennan, the Court in
Fraser had applied Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. 58
47

Id. at 682.
Id. at 682-83.
49
Id. at 682. Referring to its own 1971 decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), in which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds the criminal
conviction of an individual who wore a jacket bearing the words, “Fuck the Draft” in
public, the Court noted that “’the First Amendment gives a high school student the
classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband but not Cohen’s jacket.’” Id. at 682-83,
quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d
Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring).
50
Id. at 681.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 685.
53
Id. at 688, citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
54
See e.g., Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986) (holding that
school could not discipline a student for “giving the finger” to a teacher he encountered
in a restaurant parking lot, stating: “The First Amendment protection of freedom of
expression may not be made a casualty of the effort to force-feed good manners to the
ruffians among us”).
55
Id. at 682.
56
Id. at 689.
57
Id. at 688.
58
Indeed, Justice Marshall dissented from the decision in Fraser on the ground that
the school had not shown a “disruption of the educational process.” Id. at 690.
48
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C. The Supreme Court Finds That Schools May Exercise Editorial Control
Over Student Speech That Appears In School-Sponsored Publications.
Just two years after the Fraser decision, the Court again issued a
significant decision in the arena of students’ First Amendment rights. In
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 59 the Court held that school
officials could “exercise[e] editorial control” 60 over the contents of a
school newspaper prepared by high school students as part of a journalism
course. The students filed suit after the school principal deleted two stories
from the newspaper. 61 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
the school newspaper constituted a public forum and that school officials
could not censor the contents of the paper in the absence of a substantial
disruption under Tinker. 62 The Court reversed. First, the Court found that
the school newspaper was not a public forum, but was a vehicle for
students to learn and apply skills gained in a journalism course that existed
as part of the school’s curriculum. 63 The Court held that the pedagogical
goal of producing the school newspaper distinguished it from a public
forum such that school officials had not “relinquish[ed] school control
over that activity.” 64
The Court’s determination that the school newspaper was not a
public forum was significant because, in the Court’s view, the remaining
issue was only whether school officials had exercised their rights to
regulate the content of the newspaper in a “reasonable manner.” 65 The
question of the reasonableness, the Court stated, was the standard by
which the case was to be decided, not the substantial disruption standard
established in Tinker. 66 The Court characterized Tinker as a case involving
“[t]he question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech.” 67 The Court then contrasted Kuhlmeier as a
case involving “the question whether the First Amendment requires a
school affirmatively to promote particular speech.” 68 Finding that Tinker
was factually distinguishable, the Court then explicitly created a separate
constitutionally-permissible category of regulation over student speech. It
described this category as control over “school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
59

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 273.
61
Id. at 263. The two stories involved topics of teen pregnancy and divorce. Id.
62
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986).
63
Id. at 269-70.
64
Id. at 270.
65
Id.
66
Id. The Court in Kuhlmeier also characterized Tinker as delineating the ability of
school officials “to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on
school premises.” Id. at 271.
67
Id. at 270.
68
Id. at 270-71. The Court made clear that the Tinker did not apply, stating its
conclusion “that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may
punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school
may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.” Id.
at 272-73.
60
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parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school.” 69 In this “second form of student expression,”
the Court granted school officials great discretion, finding that school
officials do not violate the First Amendment “so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 70
As he had done in Fraser, Justice Brennan again wrote a separate
opinion, although in Kuhlmeier he dissented from the decision. 71 Joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan sharply criticized the
majority’s decision to “abandon[] Tinker” 72 and in favor of the creation of
a second category of permissible regulation over student speech. He
argued that the majority’s decision to divide student speech into
“incidental” and “school-sponsored” expression had no basis in precedent.
In so arguing, Justice Brennan discussed Fraser at length, asserting
that, just two years earlier in Fraser, the Court had “faithfully applied
Tinker.” 73 The majority in Kuhlmeier addressed that contention in a
footnote, disagreeing with Justice Brennan that the decision in Fraser had
been grounded in Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. 74 Justice
Brennan, however, argued that Tinker granted school officials sufficient
authority to regulate student expression that would interfere with a
school’s pedagogical or curricular goals. 75
In doing so, Justice Brennan employed an expansive definition of
the phrase “material disruption,” stating that school officials could censor
student expression appearing in a school newspaper if the content
contained “poor grammar, writing or research because to reward such
expression would ‘materially disrupt’ the newspaper’s curricular
purpose.” 76 He distinguished such constitutionally-permissible censorship
from censorship that was designed to shield the newspaper’s readers (the
audience) or the newspaper’s sponsor (the school) from the effect of the
expression. Citing evidence from the record, Justice Brennan concluded
that, on the facts before the Court, it was clear that school officials had
acted to shield the audience from material that they deemed to be “too
sensitive” or “unsuitable” for the audience of student-readers. That form
of censorship, he determined, was unconstitutional.

69

Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.
71
Id. at 277-91 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72
Id. at 282.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 271, n. 4, quoting Fraser, 393 U.S. at 513 (The decision in Fraser rested on
the “vulgar,” “lewd,” and “plainly offensive” character of a speech delivered at an
official school assembly rather than on any propensity of the speech to “materially
disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”).
75
Id. at 283-84. The majority interpreted Tinker’s reference to speech that invaded
the rights of other students as referring to speech of one student regarding another student
that could give rise to tort liability on the part of the school. Id. at 273 n.5.
76
Id. at 284.
70
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D. The Court Allows School Officials To Discipline Students For OnCampus Speech That Promotes Illegal Drug Use.
After the decision in Kuhlmeier, it was nearly twenty years before
the Court decided another student speech case. In a 2007 decision, Morse
v. Frederick, the Court ruled that school officials may constitutionally
regulate student speech that reasonably is perceived as promoting illegal
drug use. 77 In Morse, school officials had allowed students to leave school
grounds during school hours, although supervised by school employees, in
order to watch the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay pass by on the street. While
standing on the sidewalk, a group of students unfurled a homemade banner
displaying the message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” 78 When the school
principal saw the banner, she directed the students to take it down, and all
except one student complied. 79 The principal confiscated the banner and
suspended the student for displaying a message that promoted illegal drug
use, a message that violated school policy prohibiting such advocacy of
illegal drug use. 80 He then brought suit, alleging a violation of his First
Amendment rights. 81
The lower courts were divided; the federal district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the school on the ground that the principal
had reasonably interpreted the banner as promoting illegal drug use in
contravention of the school’s drug abuse prevention policy. 82 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that school officials had been
unable to establish that the student’s speech materially disrupted the school
environment. 83
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the discipline
had been constitutionally imposed. 84 In so holding, the Court first
addressed the student’s argument that the case was not a “school speech
case” because the student was not on school grounds. 85 The Court
summarily rejected that argument, stating that the student could not “stand
in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a schoolsanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.” 86 Although the Court
found that the particular facts of the case fell squarely within the student
speech cases, the Court did acknowledge that “there is some uncertainty at
the outer boundaries as to when the courts should apply school speech
precedents.” 87
77

551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. A photograph of the banner being displayed can be found at
https://reedsmassmedia.wordpress. com/2010/09/10/morse-v-frederick-bong-hits-4-jesus/
(last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
79
551 U.S. at 398.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 399.
82
Frederick v. Morse, 2003 WL 25274689 (D. Alaska, May 29, 2003).
83
Frederick v. Morse, 493 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
84
551 U.S. 393.
85
551 U.S. at 400.
86
Id. at 401.
87
Id., citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir.
78
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Having disposed with the student’s argument that his speech was
beyond the authority of school officials, the Court next turned to the issue
whether school officials had acted within constitutional limits. The Court
again affirmed that students do not lose their First Amendment rights at
school, but noted that the “nature of those rights is what is appropriate for
children in school.” 88 Returning the debate that had taken place twenty
years earlier between the Justices who decided both Fraser and Kuhlmeier,
the Court in Morse noted that. While the “mode of analysis employed in
Fraser [wa]s not entirely clear,” 89 it could discern two important
principles from the decision. First, due to the “special characteristics of
the school environment,” the First Amendment rights of students may be
regulated in ways that would not be constitutional if imposed upon either
adults or students in other settings. 90 The Court thus affirmed Justice
Brennan’s conclusion that the student in Fraser could not have been
disciplined by school officials had he given the speech outside of the
“school context.” 91 Second, notwithstanding Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in Fraser and later dissent in Kuhlmeier, the Court in Morse
found that, in Fraser, it had not “conduct[ed] the ‘substantial disruption’
analysis prescribed by Tinker.” 92 Thus, the Court made clear that Fraser
had established a content-based category of unprotected student speech
under which lewd or indecent speech uttered at school is subject to
discipline.
The Court in Morse also reviewed its decision in Kuhlmeier and
reaffirmed that school officials do not violate the First Amendment by
exercising control over student speech expressed in school-sponsored
activities as long as the regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.” 93 Further, the Court interpreted the decision in
Kuhlmeier to be consistent with Fraser in two important respects. First,
school officials have the ability to regulate student speech at school in
ways although they “could not censor similar speech outside the school.” 94
Second, the substantial disruption standard of Tinker “is not the only basis
for restricting student speech.” 95
Having concluded that the Court’s precedents allowed for the
creation of certain categories of regulated student speech, the Court then
created an additional content-based category by allowing restrictions on
student speech that could reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal
drug use. 96
2004).
88

Id. at 406.
Id. at 404.
90
Id. at 404-05.
91
Id. at 405.
92
Id., citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271, n. 4 (the majority in Kuhlmeier voices
disagreement with Justice Brennan in terms of the analysis conducted in Fraser).
93
Id. at 405.
94
Id. at 406.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 408. Justice Thomas concurred in the result, writing separately to argue that
Tinker is unconstitutional because the history of public education suggests that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.”
89

[]

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

11

Justice Alito concurred in the Court’s decision in Morse, but added
a significant note of caution. Specifically, Justice Alito wrote separately to
reject the argument made by school officials that they were entitled to
restrict any student speech that “interferes with a school’s educational
mission.” 97 Justice Alito wisely recognized the dangerousness of such a
position, since any particular school’s educational mission could be
defined – and re-defined – to fit the political, social or moral views of
particular administrators. 98 He emphasized that the Court’s ruling in favor
of school officials was not premised on authority to regulate student
speech that interfered with an educational mission but, rather, on the
specific and special characteristics of the school setting. On the facts
before the Court, the “threat to the physical safety of students” 99 was an
important characteristic of the school environment that had been
implicated by the student’s arguably pro-drug use banner. Employing
language that is particularly on-point when one considers the threats of
violence such as school shootings, Justice Alito stated:
School attendance can expose students to threats to their
physical safety that they would not otherwise face. Outside
of school, parents can attempt to protect their children in
many ways and may take steps to monitor and exercise
control over the persons with whom their children
associate. Similarly, students, when not in school, may be
able to avoid threatening individuals and situations. During
school hours, however, parents are not present to provide
protection and guidance, and students’ movements and their
ability to choose the persons with whom they spend time
are severely restricted. Students may be compelled on a
daily basis to spend time at close quarters with other
students who may do them harm. Experience shows that
schools can be places of special danger. 100
Justice Alito concluded that, in cases involving threats of violence,
school officials “must have greater authority to intervene.” 101 He
specifically cited Tinker’s substantial disruption standard as providing
authority for school officials to intervene “before actual violence
erupts.” 102

Id. at 410-11. This argument is firmly grounded in the physicality of being at school,
where school officials are deemed to be standing in loco parentis when children are at
school. Id. at 419. Thus, under Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the First Amendment,
school officials should have no ability to regulate student speech that occurs outside of
school, where the children’s parents have the ability to control and discipline them.
97
Id. at 423, quoting Brief of the Petitioners and Amicus Curiae.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 424.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 425.
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Id.
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THE CIRCUIT COURTS ENTER THE DIGITAL AGE.

A. The Second Circuit Establishes A “Reasonable Foreseeability” Test.
Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court decided Morse, a
case involving student speech appearing on a crudely-made, hand-painted
sign, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case involving student
speech using an entirely different mode of communication – an electronic
“instant message” (IM) distributed via the Internet. 103 Thus, only days
after the decision in Morse, the lower federal courts embarked on the
difficult task of applying the Supreme Court’s “twentieth century” student
speech cases to the predominant “twenty-first century” mode of
communication – speech that is created and distributed electronically.
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central
School District, 104 the parents of an eighth-grade student sued after their
son was disciplined for transmitting to other students an instant message
(IM) icon with a drawing depicting the shooting of the student’s English
teacher. The student argued that, because he created and distributed the
IM outside of school, his speech was beyond the authority of school
officials. 105 The Second Circuit rejected that argument, holding that school
officials did have the authority over the student’s off-campus speech
because it was “reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon would come to the
attention of school authorities” 106 or “reach” 107 the school property. The
Second Circuit then applied the Tinker test and determined that school
officials had reasonably forecast a substantial disruption.
The Second Circuit first examined the question whether the
student’s speech constituted a “true threat” under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Watts v. United States. 108 In Watts, the Court held that a
federal statute criminalizing threats against the President of the United
States required the government to establish that the speech constituted a
“true threat.” 109 The Second Circuit concluded that it need not consider
whether to apply Watts because, in its view, Tinker’s substantial disruption
standard granted school officials “significantly broader authority to
sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows.” 110 Irrespective of
the true threat analysis, student speech that advocated violence against a
teacher had the potential to materially and substantially disrupt the school
environment. 111
However, the three-judge panel in Wisniewski struggled with the
proper test to determine whether Tinker applied to student speech created
103

Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.

2007).
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Id. at 39 (the creation of the IM message outside of school did not “insulate [the
student] from discipline”).
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Id. at 38.
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Id. at 39.
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and distributed outside of school. The “panel [was] divided” 112 about
whether, in the case of off-campus speech, school officials were required
to make any additional showing about the speech’s connection to the
school environment or whether that issue was unnecessary in light of the
fact that the speech had be viewed by school officials. While noting the
panel’s disagreement, the Second Circuit held that, on the specific facts
before it, it was “reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon would come to
the attention of school authorities,” 113 thus providing authority for school
officials to discipline the student under Tinker. The requirement of
reasonable foreseeability – “both of communication to school authorities…
and the risk of substantial disruption” 114 – was satisfied because of the
threatening content of the IM icon and its “extensive distribution” 115 to
fifteen other students.
Thus, Wisniewski established a “threshold” 116 test that school
officials must satisfy before the Tinker analysis is undertaken. This
threshold test requires school officials to demonstrate “reasonable
foreseeability” that a student’s off-campus speech would come to the
attention of school authorities.
In March 2008, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari that had been filed in in Wisniewski. 117
In a case decided one year later, the Second Circuit again applied
its “reasonable foreseeability” test to determine whether school officials
could exercise authority over a student’s electronic off-campus speech. In
Doninger v. Niehoff, 118 a student who was a member of student
government was disciplined after she posted a message on a publicly
accessible blog that contained misleading information and derogatory
language about an upcoming school event, a “battle of the bands”
concert. 119 The student erroneously told the school community that the
concert had been cancelled “due to douchebags in central office” 120 and
urged students and parents to flood the school’s administrative offices with
complaints via email or telephone, with the expressed goal of “piss[ing]
[school officials] off more.” 121 Due to the student’s efforts, school
administrators did receive a deluge of complaints from students and
parents, which caused school administrators to spend significant time both
in scheduling the concert and correcting misinformation distributed by the
student. 122
Some days after the incident, the student’s blog posting was
112
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Id.
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Id. at 40.
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Id. at 39.
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Wynar v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 782 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013)
(characterizing the Second Circuit’s decision as establishing a “threshold test”).
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Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 552 U.S. 1296
(2008).
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527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Id. at 45.
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brought to the attention of the school superintendent, whose adult son
found the posting on the Internet. 123 At the time, school officials took no
action; however, approximately three weeks later, when the student took
steps to accept a nomination to serve as Senior Class Secretary, the school
principal determined that the student should be prohibited from running
for that office as discipline for her speech. 124
The student’s mother then sued. The federal district court denied
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff
had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits, 125
and the plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit first noted that the Supreme Court had not yet
addressed the “scope of a school’s authority” 126 over student off-campus
speech. Relying on its earlier decision in Wisniewski, the court then
articulated two, slightly different “foreseeability tests” to determine the
scope of school authority over off-campus speech. First, the court stated
that a student may be disciplined for off-campus speech that “’would
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school
environment’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus
expression might also reach campus.” 127 Later in the opinion, the court
stated that school discipline is permissible when “it [is] reasonably
foreseeable that the [speech will] come to the attention of school
authorities and that it would create a risk of substantial disruption.” 128
The court did not explain whether the two articulations – authority
over off-campus speech that either “reach[es] campus” or “come[s] to the
attention of school authorities” – are in fact the same measure or test.
Compounding the confusion, the Second Circuit applied both articulations
to the facts of the case. The court first stated that “it was reasonably
foreseeable that [the blog posting] would reach school property.” 129 Later
in the same paragraph, the court stated that “it was reasonably foreseeable
that … school administrators would be aware of [the blog posting].” 130
Based on these two, slightly different articulations, the Second Circuit
concluded that school officials had authority over the student’s off-campus
speech.
The Second Circuit then concluded that school officials had
correctly applied Tinker. 131 The court did not find that an actual substantial
disruption had occurred at school, only that the student’s speech had
created a foreseeable risk of a future disruption. The court cited three
reasons for this finding. 132 First, the court found that the student’s use of
“plainly offensive” language – such as calling school officials
123
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“douchebags” – inflamed the controversy rather than resolving it. 133
Second, the student’s misleading characterization of the controversy had
led to a “deluge of calls or emails” that caused school officials to “miss or
be late to school-related activities” and could have caused further
disruption had it continued. 134 Third, the court found that the student’s
position in student government leader warranted discipline. 135
After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the case continued to be
litigated in the federal courts. In January 2009, the federal district court
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the
case. 136 The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant
of summary judgment. 137 The Supreme Court then denied the student’s
petition for a writ of certiorari. 138
B. The Third Circuit Avoids The Scope of Authority Issue, But Members
Of The Court Have Strong Differences Of Opinion.
Shortly after the Second Circuit issued its decision in Doninger, the
Third Circuit began to wrestle with the scope of school authority over
student off-campus electronic speech. 139 In 2011, the Third Circuit, sitting
en banc, decided two student off-campus speech cases that had remarkably
similar facts. However, the Third Circuit’s twin decisions did not clarify
the constitutional limits of school officials’ authority to discipline students
for off-campus electronic speech. To the contrary, the decisions revealed a
deep divide among the judges on the issue.
In the first case, Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 140 a high
school senior, Justin Layshock, used his grandmother’s home computer to
create a “parody profile” of the school principal that Justin then posted on
MySpace.com. 141 The parody profile contained numerous outlandish
statements purportedly written by the principal. 142 In creating the profile,
Justin copied a photograph of the principal from the district’s website,
133

Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51.
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Id. at 52.
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Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 2009).
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Doninger v. Niehoff, 643 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
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Doninger v. Niehoff, 132 S.Ct. 499 (2011).
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Layshock ex. rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2011); J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 656 (3d Cir. 2011).
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650 F.3d 205.
141
Id. at 208-09.
142
Id. at 208. The parody profile included the following statements, among others:
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg
Ever been drunk: big number of times
Ever been called a Tease: big whore
Ever been Beaten up: big fag
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart
Number of Drugs I have taken: big.
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which he then pasted into the parody profile. 143 In addition, there was
some evidence that Justin had accessed the profile on a school computer
and shown it to a few students during school hours. 144 After Justin first
posted his profile, other students created and posted at least three
additional profiles of the principal, all of which were more vulgar than
Justin’s parody profile. 145
A few days after the first profile was posted, the principal learned
of the profile’s existence from his daughter. 146 Finding all of the profiles to
be “’degrading’ and ‘shocking,’” 147 the principal asked the school to
commence an investigation, which ultimately identified Justin as the
creator of the first profile. 148 The district disciplined Justin for violating
the school code of conduct, including prohibitions on the use of obscene
language. 149 Justin was given a 10-day suspension, sent to an alternative
education program for the remainder of his senior year, banned from all
extracurricular activities and prohibited from attending his graduation
ceremony. 150
Justin and his parents sued. 151 The federal district court granted
summary judgment in Justin’s favor on a First Amendment claim. 152 A
three-judge panel of the Third Circuit then affirmed. 153 The court found
discipline was not warranted under Fraser because no lewd or obscene
language had been used at school. 154 The court also determined that the
school had not presented evidence of any substantial disruption sufficient
to allow discipline under Tinker. 155 However, the panel opinion was
vacated pending a rehearing of the case by the Third Circuit sitting en
banc. 156
In June 2011, the Third Circuit issued it en banc decision in which
it unanimously affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Justin. 157 The Third Circuit framed the issue presented in the case
as follows:
We are asked to determine if a school district can punish a
student for expressive conduct that originated outside of the
schoolhouse, did not disturb the school environment and
143
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was not related to any school sponsored event. We hold
that, under these circumstances, the First Amendment
prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard to
impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline. 158
At the outset, the Third Circuit noted that, on appeal, the school
district had abandoned any argument that its discipline of Justin was
constitutional under Tinker. 159 Rather than relying on Tinker, the school
district argued that its discipline of Justin was constitutional under
Fraser. 160 The school district acknowledged that Fraser was limited to the
use of lewd and obscene language at school; however, the district argued
that Justin’s act of entering the district’s website to cut and paste the
principal’s picture constituted an entry into school property sufficient to
treat the profile as on-campus speech. 161 The school district also argued
that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the profile would come to the
attention of school authorities, thus employing the language of
Doninger. 162 In making this argument, the school district sought to
broaden the scope of school authority to include discipline under Fraser
for any off-campus lewd or offensive speech so long as it could be
reasonably foreseen that the lewd speech would come to the attention of
school authorities.
The Third Circuit rejected this argument. 163 It distinguished
Doninger specifically on the ground that the Second Circuit had applied
the foreseeability test to determine scope of authority to discipline a
student for substantially disruptive speech under Tinker. 164 In addition, the
Third Circuit was quite clear that it had discussed Doninger only because
the district raised the argument and, importantly, that it did not necessarily
endorse the Second Circuit’s position, stating: “[I]n citing Doninger, we
do not suggest that we agree with that court’s conclusion that the student’s
out of school expressive conduct was not protected by the First
Amendment there.” 165 Ultimately the Third Circuit concluded that Fraser
clearly applied only to the of lewd or obscene speech uttered at school and
that school officials had no authority to impose discipline for a student’s
lewd speech created and posted electronically outside of school. 166
While the en banc decision in Layshock was unanimous, the judges
of the Third Circuit clearly did not agree on the scope of authority
question. That disagreement was apparent in the second student speech
opinion that the court issued simultaneously with the Layshock decision. 167
158
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In the second case, J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School
District, 168 the court ruled 8-6 in favor of the student, although five of the
eight judges who comprised the majority joined in a separate concurring
opinion. 169
In Snyder, as in Layshock, the student – identified as J.S. – had
created an obscenity-laced fake profile of the school principal that J.S.
then posted on MySpace. 170 The profile was created outside of school and,
although it was briefly publicly available, J.S. changed the accessibility of
the profile to “private,” thus limiting access to about twenty-two other
students who were friends on MySpace. 171 The principal learned of the
profile from another student and, due to the private setting in MySpace,
was able to review its contents only after asking that student to print out a
copy of the profile and bring it to school. 172 After reviewing the profile,
the principal and other school officials disciplined J.S. 173
She and her parents then sued, claiming a violation of her First
Amendment rights. 174 Unlike the Layshock case, the federal district court
determined that the school’s discipline of J.S. had been unconstitutional
under Fraser because the speech, although lewd and vulgar, could not be
considered “on-campus” speech. 175 A three-judge panel of the Third
Circuit first affirmed the district court’s ruling, then vacated the decision
pending a rehearing en banc. 176 After additional briefing and oral
argument, a narrow majority of the Third Circuit reversed the lower
court’s ruling on the First Amendment issue and remanded the case to the
lower court for further proceedings. 177
The majority in Snyder avoided the central issue whether school
officials have authority to discipline students for off-campus speech,
stating that it would “assume, with deciding, that Tinker applies to [offcampus] speech.” 178 In other words, the court treated the student’s speech
as on-campus speech contemplated in Tinker. The majority did note the
student’s argument that school officials’ ability to discipline students was
168
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Id. at 936 (Smith, J., McKee, C.J., Sloviter, J., Fuentes, J. and Hardiman, J.,
concurring).
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Id. at 920-21. The profile was written as if it described the life of a “bi-sexual
Alabama middle school principal named ‘M-Hoe.’” Id. at 920. The profile listed the
fictious principal’s interests as: “’detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain,
spending time with my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking
in my office, hitting on students and their parents.’” Id.
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limited to the schoolhouse and acknowledged that the argument had “some
appeal,” but deemed it unnecessary to reach the issue in order to decide in
the student’s favor. 179 Rather, the majority found that, even assuming that
Tinker applied, the district had not presented any evidence of a substantial
disruption that would warrant the discipline imposed on J.S. 180 The
majority also determined that the lower court had erred in applying Fraser
to the student’s speech, stating that “Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard [could
not] be extended to justify a school’s punishment of J.S. for use of profane
language outside the school, during non-school hours.” 181
Judge D. Brooks Smith wrote a concurring opinion, joined by four
other judges, in which he directly addressed the scope of authority
question avoided by the majority. 182 Judge Smith gave a clear “No”
answer to the scope of authority question, stating that “the First
Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same
extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large.” 183 Using
the Supreme Court’s own language, Judge Smith concluded that Tinker’s
holding “is expressly grounded in ‘the special characteristics of the school
environment’” 184 and grants limited authority to “’prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.’” 185 He predicted dire consequences if the authority
granted to school officials under Tinker was extended too far, stating:
Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a
precedent with ominous implications. Doing so would
empower schools to regulate students’ expressive activity
no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what
subject matter it involves – so long as it causes a substantial
disruption at school. … Suppose a high school student,
while at home after school hours, were to write a blog entry
defending gay marriage. Suppose further that several of the
student’s classmates got wind of the entry, took issue with
it, and caused a significant disturbance at school. While the
school could clearly punish the students who acted
disruptively, if Tinker were held to apply to off-campus
speech, the school could also punish the student whose blog
entry brought about the disruption. That cannot be, nor is
it, the law. 186
As Judge Smith framed the issue, the difficult question was not whether
179
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Tinker could extend to “off-campus” speech but the test to determine
whether speech has occurred “on” or “off” campus. 187 Using the example
of a student who might email a teacher from home, Judge Smith opined
that speech by a student that is “intentionally directed towards a school”
would be considered “on-campus” speech and thus subject to the authority
of school officials. 188
Yet Judge Smith soundly rejected the Second Circuit’s
foreseeability test, stating that “a bare foreseeability standard could be
stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that
happened to discuss school-related matters.” 189 He rejected the notion that
truly off-campus speech somehow “mutate[s]” into on-campus speech by
reaching the campus. 190 As to the fake profile created by J.S., Judge Smith
determined that the profile did not constitute on-campus speech that was
subject to discipline under Tinker. 191
As stated above, the Third Circuit was highly divided in the Snyder
case. Six of the fourteen judges dissented from the decision to affirm the
lower court’s ruling on the First Amendment issue. 192 The dissenting
judges applied Tinker to the student’s speech, arguing that school officials
could have reasonably forecasted a future disruption due to the student’s
speech. 193 In particular, the dissenting judges forcefully argued that
“personal and harmful attacks on educators and school officials” are
always disruptive to the school community. 194 A great deal of the
dissenting opinion was devoted specifically to outlining reasons why
students ought to be subject to discipline for “off-campus hostile and
offensive student internet speech that is directed at school officials.” 195
And the dissenters also opined that school authority should extend to
speech created by students outside of school due to the “near-constant
student access to social networking sites on and off campus.” 196
Indeed, in the view of some Third Circuit judges, the two decisions
in Layshock and Snyder were “competing opinions” 197 that had created
uncertainty on the scope of authority issue. 198 Judge Kent A. Jordan wrote
a concurring opinion in Layshock specifically to assert his strong view
that, under Tinker, school officials could exercise authority over a
187
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student’s off-campus speech. 199 Judge Jordan used somewhat strong
language to criticize two of the opinions in Snyder. He criticized the
majority in Snyder for failing to address the scope of authority question
and simply “assuming” that Tinker applied. 200 Judge Smith’s position was
criticized on the ground that the “’off-campus versus on-campus’
distinction is artificial and untenable in the world we live in today.” 201
Judge Jordan found that the “omnipresence” 202 of speech
communicated via “wireless internet access, smart phones, tablet
computers, social networking services like Facebook, and stream-ofconsciousness communications via Twitter” 203 renders any rule based on
“physical boundaries of a school campus” 204 unworkable. Judge Jordan
advocated that school officials be given broad authority to “forecast how
poisonous accusations lobbed over the internet are likely to play out within
the school community” 205 and to impose discipline whenever school
officials might reasonable forecast a disruption. Although he did make
note of the Supreme Court’s reference to an “uncertainty at the outer
boundaries” 206 of what constitutes speech subject to school authority,
Judge Jordan made no effort to define that outer boundary or otherwise
articulate a limitation on the scope of the authority of school officials.
The Supreme Court denied petitions for writs of certiorari that had
been filed in both Snyder and Layshock. 207
C. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits Adopt the Second Circuit’s
“Reasonable Foreseeability” Test.
In a decision issued just one month after the Third Circuit’s
fractured rulings in Layshock and Snyder, the Fourth Circuit continued to
complicate the scope of authority issue in a case that involved
cyberbullying. 208 A high school student, Kara Kowalski, had created a
discussion group webpage entitled “S.A.S.H.,” which other students
recognized as an acronym for the phrase “Students Against Shay’s
Herpes,” where “Shay” referred to another student at school. 209 Kowalski
then invited about 100 members of the school community to join the
group. 210 Approximately two dozen high school students did join the group
and many of them posted derogatory comments and photographs of Shay,
the target of the webpage. 211 School officials were unaware of the page
199
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until it was brought to their attention by Shay’s parents. 212
After conducting an investigation, school officials determined that
the student had violated the school’s written bullying and harassment
policy and punished her by, among other things, issuing a 90-day social
suspension and prohibiting her from participating on the cheerleading
squad for the remainder of the school year. 213
The student then sued both the school district and several school
officials, asserting both First Amendment and Due Process claims. 214 After
the federal district court dismissed all claims, 215 the student appealed,
claiming that “school administrators had no power to discipline her” 216
because her speech had been created and distributed off-campus. Citing
the Second Circuit’s decision in Doninger, school officials argued that
school officials had authority over the student’s speech because it was
foreseeable that it would “reach the school.” 217 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that school officials did have
authority over the student’s speech and that the discipline had comported
with Tinker.
However, the rationale behind the Fourth Circuit’s determination
on the scope of authority issue was somewhat unclear. In addressing the
scope of authority question, the Fourth Circuit stated:
There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s
interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students
when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse
gate. But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are
satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman
High School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong
to justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out
their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being. 218
The Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “nexus” has led some courts
and commentators to conclude that, on the scope of authority issue, the
Fourth Circuit had created a different test than the foreseeability test
articulated in Doninger. 219 This so-called “nexus” test apparently examines
added a caption that read “portrait of a whore.” Id.
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Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2012) (describing
Kowalski as adopting a “sufficient nexus approach”); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone
Viral:Diverging Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital
Student Speech, 82 F ORDHAM L. REV. 3395 (2014); Mary Noe, Sticks and Stones Will
Break My Bones But Whether Words Harm Will Be Decided By A Judge, 88 N.Y. STATE
BAR J. 39, 40 (Jan. 2016). But see Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
551 (“The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits all considered the question of the
reasonable foreseeability that a student’s off-campus speech would reach the school
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the strength of the connection between the speech and school. 220 And yet
nowhere in the opinion did the Fourth Circuit say either that it disagreed
with the Doninger test or that it was crafting a different test on the scope
of authority issue. Also absent is any discussion of the facts or factors by
which a sufficient nexus could be established in student speech cases
generally or in the specific case itself. Thus, if the Fourth Circuit had
intended to adopt a “nexus” test for off-campus speech that differed from
Doninger, it failed to define that test. 221
In fact, rather than rejecting the reasoning of Doninger, the Fourth
Circuit discussed Doninger at length and actually applied the foreseeability
test to the facts before it. 222 The opinion includes a lengthy paragraph in
which the court described Doninger and quoted the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that discipline is appropriate when “it [i]s … foreseeable that
the off-campus expression might … reach campus.” 223 The Fourth Circuit
also applied the reasonable foreseeability test to the facts before it, finding
that “it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski’s conduct would reach
the school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices….” 224
Thus, it is fair to conclude that the Fourth Circuit applied the Doninger
foreseeability test rather than creating a new and different “nexus” test.
The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari that
had been filed in Kowalski. 225
In a case decided just one month after Kowalski, the Eighth Circuit
also relied upon the Second Circuit’s foreseeability test in holding that
school officials had authority over a student’s off-campus expression that
threatened a school shooting. In D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School
District No. 60, 226 the Eighth Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s
decision in Wisniewski to find that authority over a student’s off-campus
speech exists when it is “reasonably foreseeable” that the student’s speech
would “come to the attention of school authorities.” 227 One year later, the
Eighth Circuit relied on both Doninger and Kowalski as support for its
application of a foreseeability test, finding that school officials had
authority to discipline students for racist speech posted on the Internet
because the speech “could reasonably be expected to reach the school or
impact the school environment.” 228

before extending Tinker to off-campus speech.”).
220
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 569 Pa. 638, 667-68 (2002).
221
Toll, supra, note 219, at 3431.
222
652 F.3d at 574.
223
Id, (quoting Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48, quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40).
224
Id.
225
Kowalski v. Berkley Cty. Sch., 132 S.Ct.1095 (2012).
226
647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
227
Id. at 765-766.
228
S.J.W. ex. rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.
2012).
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D. The Ninth Circuit Declines To Adopt Any Of The Previously
Articulated Tests.
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit became the fifth federal circuit to
address the scope of authority issue in the context of students’ off-campus
electronic speech. In Wynar v. Douglas County School District, 229 the
Ninth Circuit held that school officials had authority to discipline a student
who, from his home, had sent “a string of increasingly violent and
threatening instant messages … bragging about his weapons, threatening to
shoot specific classmates, intimating that he would ‘take out’ other people
at a school shooting on a specific date, and invoking the image of the
Virginia Tech massacre.” 230
In addressing the scope of authority issue, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed all of the earlier decisions of its “sister circuits,” 231 including the
decisions in Kowalski, Lee’s Summit, Wiesniewski, Snyder and a 2004
decision of the Fifth Circuit involving student off-campus speech that was
not communicated electronically. 232 The Ninth Circuit noted that, in
Doninger, Kowalski and Lee’s Summit, the courts had devised “additional
threshold test[s]” 233 as prerequisite to the application of Tinker’s
substantial disruption standard. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, each case had
created different threshold tests. 234 The Ninth Circuit interpreted Kowalski
as establishing a “nexus” test235 and Lee’s Summit as establishing a test
requiring that the speech be “’reasonably foreseeable [to] will reach the
school community.’” 236 Citing Wiesniewski (not Doninger), the Ninth
Circuit asserted that the Second Circuit’s threshold test was not clear, but
that it permitted school discipline where “it is reasonably foreseeable that
speech meeting the Tinker test will wind up at school ….” 237 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the Third and Fifth Circuits had “left open the
question whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech.” 238
In the end, the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt any of the positions
of its sister circuits. The court noted the difficulty of articulating “a global

229

728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1064-65.
231
Id. at 1067.
232
In Porter, the Fifth Circuit case held that school officials had no authority to
discipline a student who had drawn a picture depicting violence at school, which came to
the attention of school officials two years after its creation, when the student’s younger
brother discovered the picture at home and took it to school. 393 F.3d at 620.
233
728 F.3d at 1068.
234
Id. at 1068-69.
235
Id. at 1068.
236
Id. at 1068.
237
Id. at 1068-69. It seems incorrect for the Ninth Circuit to have relied on the
opinion in Wiesniewski when the later opinion in Doninger expands on the Second
Circuit’s view of the scope of authority issue. 527 F.3d 41. However, it may be that the
Ninth Circuit chose to use Wiesniewski because that case, like the one before the Ninth
Circuit, involved a threat of violence.
238
Id. at 1069.
230
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standard for a myriad of circumstances involving off-campus speech.” 239 It
also expressed “reluctan[ce] to … craft a one-size-fits-all approach.” 240
Rather, the court relied on the content of the student’s speech, stating that,
“when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may
take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech” that would
cause a substantial disruption. 241 The court then affirmed the trial court’s
determination that school officials had not violated the student’s First
Amendment rights, noting that “it is an understatement that the specter of
a school shooting” could cause a substantial disruption at school. 242
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit also analyzed the student’s speech
under the “rights of others” prong that the Supreme Court had articulated
in Tinker. 243 The Ninth Circuit did note that this standard is little used by
the federal circuit courts, but also held that it was quite an apt standard to
apply to speech that threatened a school shooting. 244 The court stated:
“[w]hatever the scope of the “rights of other students to be secure and to
be let alone,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 773, without doubt the
threat of a school shooting impinges on those rights.” 245
E. The Fifth Circuit Creates A New Test On The Scope of Authority Issue.
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the sixth circuit
court to grapple with the scope of authority issue in the context of student
off-campus electronic speech. The court’s en banc decision in Bell v.
Itawamba County School Board, 246 in which sixteen members of the Fifth
Circuit authored eight different opinions, epitomizes the deep divisions
among the circuit courts on this issue.
The student’s speech in Bell was a rap song recorded outside of
school and posted on the Facebook page of Taylor Bell, a student at
Itawamba Agricultural High School who recorded the song under the
name “T-Bizzle.” 247 The rap song, which was riddled with vulgar and
obscene language, accused two of the high school’s athletic coaches of
sexually harassing female students. 248 The two coaches were easily
identified from the lyrics of the rap song. 249 In addition to accusing the two
coaches of sexual harassment, some lyrics referred to acts of violence
against the coaches, as follows:

239

728 F.3d at 1069.
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 1070. The Ninth Circuit also invoked Tinker’s language referring to the
“rights of other students to be secure and let alone.” Id., quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
508.
243
Id. at 1071-72.
244
Id. at 1072.
245
Id.
246
799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
247
Id. at 383-84.
248
Id. at 383.
249
Id.
240
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“Run up on T-Bizzle/I’m gonna hit you with my rueger;” 250
“You fucking with the wrong one/going to get a pistol down
your mouth;” 251 and
“Middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga/middle fingers
up/he get no mercy, nigga.” 252

The day after Mr. Bell posted the rap recording to his Facebook
page, one of the coaches learned about the song from his wife, listened to
the song while at school, and immediately informed the school’s
principal. 253 The school district’s superintendent also was informed. 254 The
next school day, the principal and superintendent, along with the school
district’s outside counsel, questioned Mr. Bell about the recording, but
took no action. 255
Due to inclement weather, school was closed for four consecutive
school days. 256 During that time, Mr. Bell created a new version of the
recording and uploaded it to YouTube. When Mr. Bell returned to school
following the four-day break, he was informed at midday that he was
suspended pending a disciplinary hearing; however, he was permitted to
remain at school for the remainder of the school day so that he could take
the school bus home. 257
Approximately two weeks later, a disciplinary hearing was held. 258
Mr. Bell appeared before the disciplinary committee and stated that he had
created the rap song to bring awareness to the issue of alleged harassment
by the coaches and that he had not intended to make any threats of
violence against the school coaches, although he acknowledged that the
words of the rap song could be construed as a threat. 259 Following the
hearing, the disciplinary committee determined that it could not
conclusively find that the Mr. Bell’s song constituted a threat to
teachers, 260 but that his speech had constituted harassment or intimidation
of teachers in violation of school policy. 261 The disciplinary committee
recommended that the school board impose several sanctions, including
placement in the county’s alternative school for the remainder of the
grading period. 262
Id. at 384. The court noted that the word “rueger” referred to a firearm
manufactured by Sturm, Ruger & Co. Id. at 385.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 385. The court noted that the word “cap” is slang for “shoot.” Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 386.
260
Id. The school board’s attorney sent a letter to Mr. Bell’s mother informing her
that the disciplinary committee had found “the issue of whether or not lyrics published by
Taylor Bell constituted threats to school district teachers was vague.” Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
250
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Mr. Bell appealed the committee’s decision to the school board,
which reviewed the matter and determined that Mr. Bell had not only
harassed or intimated school employees, but that he also had made threats
against them. 263 The school board thus accepted the disciplinary
committee’s recommendation. 264
Immediately thereafter, Mr. Bell and his mother filed suit. 265
Initially the Bells sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the school board’s disciplinary sanctions; 266 however,
the federal district court denied the motion as moot because Mr. Bell’s
placement at the alternative school had ended. 267 Later, the federal district
granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, finding that
Mr. Bell’s rap song had “in fact caused a material and substantial
disruption at school” and also that school officials had reasonably forecast
that a substantial disruption could take place at school. 268
The Bells then appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 269 In December 2014,
a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, finding
that the school board had violated Mr. Bell’s First Amendment rights by
disciplining him for his off-campus speech. 270 The decision was a 2-1
ruling, with Judge Rhesa Barksdale writing a vigorous dissent. 271 In
February 2015, the Fifth Circuit granted the school board’s petition for a
rehearing en banc and vacated the earlier opinion pending additional
briefing and oral argument before the en banc panel. 272 Oral argument was
heard before the en banc panel on May 12, 2015. 273
The en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in August
2015. 274 The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the school board, finding that the board had not violated Mr.
Bell’s First Amendment rights. 275 However, the en banc panel of the Fifth
Circuit was highly divided. Of the twelve judges in the majority, six
judges either authored or joined in separately written concurring
opinions. 276 Four judges dissented from the decision, and each of the
dissenting judges wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 277
263

Id. at 387.
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 388.
268
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
269
799 F.3d at 388. Although Mr. Bell and his mother had asserted claims in
addition to an allegation violation of First Amendment rights, the Bells appealed only the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the school board as to Mr. Bell’s
First Amendment claim. Id.
270
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014).
271
Id. at 304 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
272
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 782 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2015).
273
See Docket Sheet for Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 12-60264 (5th Cir.)
(noting that oral argument was held on May 12, 2015).
274
799 F.3d 379.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
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The majority opinion278 began by reviewing the Supreme Court’s
four student speech cases, ultimately concluding that the constitutionality
of discipline imposed on Mr. Bell properly should be analyzed under
Tinker rather than any of the other school speech cases. 279
On the scope of authority issue, the majority opinion in Bell
asserted that five of six circuit courts to address the issue had determined
that “under certain circumstances, Tinker applies to speech which
originated, and was disseminated, off-campus.” 280 In tallying up the circuit
courts that had extended Tinker to off-campus speech, the majority in Bell
included the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wynar notwithstanding the Ninth
Circuit’s express reluctance to adopt any of the threshold tests of the other
circuit and the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to fashion its own test under which
students’ off-campus electronic speech generally would be subject to
school authority. 281 The majority also included its own circuit as one that
favored extending Tinker to off-campus speech even though the Fifth
Circuit had not yet addressed the issue. 282 Additionally, two of the three
prior Fifth Circuit cases on the issue had found in favor of the students on
the ground that school authority did not extend to speech created offcampus. 283 The only pro-school Fifth Circuit decision cited by the majority
was decided in 1973, decades before the Supreme Court decided Fraser,
Kuhlmeier or Morse and, of course, before the widespread use of
electronic communications. 284
Although counting all but the Third Circuit as having concluded
that Tinker can apply to off-campus speech, 285 the majority opinion did
note that the circuit courts had taken “varied approaches” 286 to the issue.
The majority expressly declined either to “adopt or reject approaches
advocated by other circuits” 287 or to “adopt any rigid standard” 288 with
regard to the scope of authority issue; rather, it fashioned a test entirely
limited to the facts before it. The majority held that Tinker applies to a
278
The majority opinion was written by Judge Barksdale, who had dissented from the
decision in the original panel opinion in the case. 774 F.3d at 304 (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting).
279
Id. at 392.
280
Id. at 393.
281
Id. at 394. For the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to adopt tests fashioned by other courts
or to draft its own, generally applicable test, see Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068-69.
282
Id. at 393-94.
283
Porter, 393 F.3d 608; Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th
Cir. 1972). In Shanley, the Fifth Circuit held that school officials did not have authority
to discipline students for the distribution of a newspaper created outside of school and
distributed “near but outside the school premises.” Id. at 964. The Fifth Circuit did apply
Tinker in determining that the distribution of the newspaper had not caused a substantial
disruption at school; however, the court also emphasized the out-of-school nature of the
students’ conduct. Id.
284
See Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.3d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding that the First Amendment did not protect the conduct of students who stood just
outside an entrance to school campus selling an underground newspaper to other students
who were entering campus).
285
Id. at 393-94.
286
Id. at 395.
287
799 F.3d at 396.
288
Id.
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student’s off-campus speech when (a) “a student intentionally directs
[speech] at the school community;” and (b) the speech is “reasonably
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a
teacher.” 289
Those two circumstances only addressed the preliminary question
whether school officials had the authority to examine the student’s speech
under the Tinker substantial disruption standard. 290 Thus, in order to
answer the penultimate question whether the conduct of officials had
violated Mr. Bell’s First Amendment rights, the majority considered
whether his speech either had caused a substantial disruption or could have
been reasonably forecast to cause a substantial disruption. 291 On that
question, the majority concluded that school officials could have
reasonably foreseen that Mr. Bell’s rap song would cause a future
substantial disruption had he not been disciplined. 292
As noted above, there were multiple concurring and dissenting
opinions written in Bell. Several judges who concurred in the decision
wrote concurring opinions in an apparent effort to limit the scope of the
majority decision. 293 For example, Judge E. Grady Jolly wrote a separate
concurring opinion in which he stated that he would have decided the case
“in the simplest way … by saying as little as possible.” 294 Judge Jolly
would have adopted a more limited rule focused solely on threats of
violence, as follows:
Student speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and
is subject to school discipline when that speech contains an
actual threat to kill or physically harm personnel and/or
students of the school; which actual threat is connected to
the school environment; and which actual threat is
communicated to the school, or its students, or its
personnel. 295
Thus, Judge Jolly would not have addressed off-campus student speech
that could be construed harassing or intimidating a teacher.
Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod wrote a concurring opinion that also
focused only on threats of physical violence. 296 She opined that the
majority opinion did not make Tinker applicable to off-campus student
speech of a non-threatening nature “even if some school administrators
might consider such speech offensive, harassing or disruptive.” 297 Indeed,
Judge Walker quoted from Judge Smith’s concurring opinion in the Third
289

Id.
Id.
291
Id. at 397.
292
Id. at 398-400.
293
Id. at 400 (Jolly, J., concurring); Id. at 401 (Walker Elrod, J., Jones, J.,
concurring).
294
Id. at 401 (Jolly, J., concurring).
295
Id.
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Id. at 401 (Walker Elrod, J., Jones, J., concurring).
297
Id. at 402.
290
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Circuit’s decision in Snyder, where Judge Smith warned that “broad offcampus application of Tinker ‘would create a precedent with ominous
implications.’” 298 Casting the majority opinion in Bell as one that avoided
such ominous implications by “sensibly” limiting the scope of school
authority to student speech that “contained threats of physical violence,”
Judge Walker concurred in the result. 299
Finally, Judge Gregg Costa wrote a concurring opinion, 300 joined
by two other members of the panel, in which he emphasized the need for
guidance from the Supreme Court on the scope of authority issue, stating:
Broader questions raised by off-campus speech will be left
for another day. That day is coming soon, however, and
this court or the higher one will need to provide clear
guidance for students, teachers, and school administrators
that balances students’ First Amendment rights that Tinker
rightly recognized with the vital need to foster a school
environment conducive to learning. That task will not be
easy in light of the pervasive use of social media among
students and the disruptive effect on learning that such
speech can have when it is directed at fellow students and
educators. 301
Four judges of the en banc panel dissented from the decision in
Bell, and each judge wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 302 Judge James
L. Dennis, who had written the majority opinion in the original panel
decision that was vacated pending en banc review, 303 wrote a scathing
dissent in which he accused the majority of committing “several serious
and unfortunate constitutional errors.” 304 In sharp words, he accused the
majority of gutting students’ First Amendment rights:
[T]he majority opinion obliterates the historically significant
distinction between the household and the schoolyard by
permitting a school policy to supplant parental authority
over the propriety of a child’s expressive activities on the
Internet outside of school, expanding schools’ censorial
authority from the campus and the teacher’s classroom to
the home and the child’s bedroom. 305
In sharp contrast to the approach taken by the majority, Judge Dennis’s
analysis of the issue began not with the question whether Mr. Bell’s
298

Id.
Id.
300
Id. (Costa, J., Owen, J., Higginson, J., concurring).
301
Id. at 403.
302
Id. (Dennis, J, Graves, J., Prado, J., dissenting); Id. at 433 (Prado, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 435 (Haynes, J., dissenting); Id. (Graves, J., dissenting).
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774 F.3d 280.
304
Id. at 406.
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Id. at 404.
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speech was “student” speech or not but whether his speech was entitled to
First Amendment protection generally. 306 In other words, Judge Dennis
first treated Mr. Bell a citizen, not a student. 307 Characterizing Mr. Bell’s
rap song as speech on an issue of public concern, specifically alleged
sexual harassment of female students, Judge Dennis opined that Mr. Bell’s
speech was speech that “’occupie[d] the highest rung of hierarchy of First
Amendment values and [thus] … entitled to special protection.’” 308 Citing
Supreme Court precedent, 309 Judge Dennis opined that the vulgar and
violent words used in the song did not alter the conclusion that the song
addressed a matter of public concern, even if Mr. Bell’s words “f[e]ll
short of the School Board’s aesthetic preferences for socio-political
commentary ….” 310
Judge Dennis next criticized the majority’s two-part test for
determining whether Mr. Bell’s rap song was student speech subject to the
disciplinary power of school authorities. As to the first part of the test, the
requirement that a student must have “intentionally directed” speech at the
school community, Judge Dennis noted that such a requirement would
eviscerate the First Amendment by punishing the speaker for attempting to
communicate his or her message to others. 311 In other words, a student
could avoid satisfying this requirement of “intentional direction” only if
the student communicated so privately that his or her message would not
be seen by many in school community.
As to the second part of the majority’s test – that the speech would
be reasonably understood to constitute threatening, harassing or
intimidating language toward a teacher, Judge Dennis decried the use of
“content-based” and “vague” language as a means to determine First
Amendment protection. 312 He concluded that the “majority opinion’s
failure to define ‘threatening,’ ‘harassing,’ or ‘intimidating’” language
made its articulated test constitutionally unworkable. 313 Judge Dennis also
306

Id. at 406-12.
Indeed, Judge Dennis criticized the majority for “simply assuming that all
children speak “qua students,” Id. at 425, and for otherwise assuming that “minors’
constitutional rights outside of school are somehow qualified if they coincidentally are
enrolled in a public school.” Id. (emphasis in original).
308
Id. at 406, quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
309
Judge Dennis reviewed at length the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), in which the Court found that the First Amendment
prohibited the imposition of tort liability against the Westboro Baptist Church, a fringe
group that had picketed the funerals of American soldiers killed in the line of duty. Id. at
448. At such funerals, picketers had displayed signs that read, among other things,
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for IEDs, and “God Hates the USA/Thank
God for 9/11.” Id. at 449. The Court held that such speech was protected under the First
Amendment because the picketers had been commenting on matters of public concern. Id.
at 451. Such speech is protected by the First Amendment even if it is “upsetting,”
“arouses contempt,” or expressed an idea that society finds to be “offensive or
disagreeable.” Id. at 458.
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799 F.3d at 409.
311
799 F.3d at 411.
312
Id. at 413-16.
313
Id. at 416.
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opined that this vague language would impermissibly define First
Amendment protection according to the potential reactions of listeners. 314
He categorically rejected any test of free speech that would rely on the
listener’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the speech as harassing or
intimidating. 315 Judge Dennis expressed concern that the constitutional
infirmities of such vague language were further “exacerbated by the facts
that the Tinker [substantial disruption] standard itself could be viewed as
somewhat vague.” 316 In Judge Dennis’s view, these “various layers of
vagueness” would impermissibly restrict students’ First Amendment
protections. 317
Judge Dennis made no attempt to fashion an alternative test to
govern the scope of authority over students’ off-campus speech. Rather,
he simply criticized the majority’s decision to apply Tinker to the offcampus speech at issue in the case, finding that the Tinker standard had
been created only for the purpose of allowing school officials to
“counteract the consequences of speech that actually occurs within the
school environment.” 318 He also criticized the extension of school
authority to student off-campus speech as an unwarranted intrusion into
parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children. 319 Finally, Judge
Dennis concluded that, even if school officials had the authority to
discipline Mr. Bell for his off-campus speech, they had violated his First
Amendment rights because the facts did not demonstrate either an actual
substantial disruption at school or a reasonable forecast of a substantial
disruption. 320
Judge Edward C. Prado also wrote a dissenting opinion in Bell. 321
The main thrust of Judge Prado’s opinion was the “hope that the Supreme
Court will soon give courts the necessary guidance to resolve these
difficult cases.” 322 He noted that Mr. Bell’s speech did not fit into
“currently established, narrow categories of unprotected speech” 323
previously articulated by the Supreme Court. Judge Prado briefly
reviewed some of the existing circuit court decisions addressing student
off-campus electronic speech, before concluding that the majority opinion
had “appear[ed] to depart from the other, already divided circuits in yet
another direction.” 324 Judge Prado then stated that he “would wait for the
Supreme Court to act before exempting a new category of speech from
314
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Id. at 421.
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Id. at 419.
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Id. at 425.
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Id. at 426, quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is a
dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority – including their
authority to determine what their children may say and hear – to public school
authorities”).
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Id. at 427-31.
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Id. at 433-35.
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Id.
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Id. at 434. He also stated that the issue of students’ off-campus electronic speech
was a “poor fit” within current First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 433.
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Id. at 433-34.
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First Amendment protection.” 325 He did express concern over the
potentially harmful impact that students’ off-campus speech could have on
the school community, but concluded that “the difficult issues of offcampus online speech will need to be addressed by the Supreme Court.” 326
Judge Catharina Haynes wrote a brief dissenting opinion in which
she stated that she would have reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for reasons stated in the
majority opinion of the three-judge panel that had originally decided the
case. 327
Finally, Judge James E. Graves authored a dissenting opinion in
which he proposed that a “modified Tinker standard” 328 be used in cases
involving student off-campus speech. Judge Graves’s test borrowed pieces
and parts from the decisions of other circuits, principally the Doninger and
Kowalski cases. 329 The test proposed by Judge Graves would allow school
officials to discipline a student for off-campus speech if the school could
(a) satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption standard (either an actual or
reasonably forecasted disruption) and (b) “demonstrate a sufficient nexus
between the speech and the school’s pedagogical interests that would
justify the school’s discipline of the student.” 330 Three non-exclusive
factors could demonstrate a sufficient nexus. Those factors were: (a)
“whether the speech could reasonably be expected to reach the school
environment;” 331 (b) “whether the school’s interest as trustee of student
well-being” 332 outweighs parents’ traditional role in disciplining their
children for conduct outside of school; 333 and (c) “whether the
predominant message of the student’s speech is entitled to heightened
protection.” 334
On November 17, 2015, Mr. Bell filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court. 335 On February 29, 2016, the Supreme
Court denied the petition. 336
325
Id. Judge Prado did note that the Fifth Circuit previously had held that student
speech threatening violence on the scale of “mass, systematic school-shootings in the
style that has become painfully familiar in the United States” is not protected by the First
Amendment. Id. (emphasis added), quoting Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508
F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir. 2007).
326
Id. at 435.
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Id., citing Bell, 774 F.3d at 290-303.
328
799 F.3d at 435.
329
Id. at 436 & n. 2-6.
330
Id.
331
Id. & n.3, citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50;
D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 766.
332
Id.
333
As to this second factor, Judge Graves proposed that a court should give
particular weight to evidence, experiential or otherwise, that indicated that certain forms
of student off-campus speech had “a unique and proven adverse impact on students and
the campus environment.” Id. He specifically referenced the research on bullying that
had been cited by the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski as an example of such evidence. Id. &
n.6.
334
Id.
335
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15666, 2015 WL 7299351 (U.S.) (filed Nov. 17, 2015).
336
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S.Ct. 1166 (2016).
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EXISTING PRECEDENTS PROVIDE THE F RAMEWORK TO ADDRESS
STUDENTS’ F IRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE.

The splintered and disparate approaches taken by the federal circuit
courts have resulted in scores of different opinions among scholars and
educators about the proper framework to be applied to student off-campus
electronic speech. Most commentators agree that students have the free
speech rights of an ordinary citizen when not at school. Also a point of
general agreement is that students have the right to a safe and secure
learning environment uninterrupted by the speech of other students. How
to accomplish those twin goals is a subject of much debate.
Although the scope of students’ First Amendment rights regarding
off-campus electronic speech is a thorny one, the Supreme Court’s
existing precedents, when considered together, largely provide the
appropriate framework to balance students’ constitutional rights against the
authority of school officials to maintain an orderly and effective learning
environment at school. In particular, the Tinker standards largely provide
the appropriate framework to address students’ free speech rights in the
digital age. 337
A. The Court Should Create A New Category Of Unprotected Student
Speech: Speech That Threatens Death or Serious Bodily Harm To A
Member Of The School Community.
Clearly the on-campus/off-campus distinction should not protect
student speech that threatens serious physical harm to any member of the
school community, whether the threat is akin to a Columbine-type
shooting338 or a specific threat made against a particular individual. 339
Students and school employees alike should be protected from threats of
death or serious bodily harm. Thus, the First Amendment should not
protect any student’s off-campus electronic speech that a school official
reasonably believes is a credible threat of death or serious bodily harm
against either the school community in general or any member of the
school community.
To date, the courts essentially have recognized and upheld this
principle, although the legal reasoning they have employed to reach this
conclusion has varied. 340 For example, in Wisniewski, the Second Circuit
337

There are scholars who have advocated that Tinker be abandoned completely. See,
e.g., R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1 (2014).
Others have advocated that a different standard be created specifically for students’
“technology-facilitated expression.” Kathleen Conn, The Third Circuit En Banc
Decisions On Out-Of-School Student Speech: Analysis and Recommendations, 270 E DUC.
L. REP. 389, 406 (2011).
338
Wynar, 728 F.3d 1062
339
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d 34; J.S., 569 Pa. at 667-68 (the student’s off-campus
speech included a drawing of a teacher with her head cut off and blood dripping from her
neck, accompanied by a list of reason why she should die).
340
See Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School
Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 599-
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applied a threshold test premised on some “reasonable foreseeability” that
speech would reach school a student’s off-campus speech that threatened a
teacher. 341 In Wynar, the Ninth Circuit employed no threshold test, but
determined that a student’s off-campus threats of a school shooting were
not protected under Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. 342 In Bell, the
Fifth Circuit determined that Tinker would apply to student off-campus
speech of a threatening nature if the student “intentionally directed” the
speech at the school community. 343
Thus, while these cases may have reached the correct
conclusion, 344 the courts’ varying approaches do not provide clear
guidance for school officials.
The most suitable approach is to simply create an additional
category of unprotected student speech. Since the Court decided Tinker in
1969, it has not hesitated to create additional categories of unprotected
student speech. In at least two cases, the Court approved content-based
restrictions on student speech. In Fraser, the Court ruled that lewd,
indecent and offensive speech was not protected when uttered at school. 345
In Morse, the Court ruled that student speech that promotes illegal drug
use is not protected. 346 Importantly, in deciding Morse, the Court took
pains to clarify that, in Fraser, it had not applied Tinker but had created a
separate category of unprotected student speech. 347 Thus, the Court in
Morse approved of content-based restrictions on student speech if
necessary to maintain order at school.
While these two content-based categories obviously were limited to
the school environment, the rationale for creating these categories was
broadly grounded in the “special dangers” 348 that can exist at school and
the “special characteristics of the school environment.” 349 Obviously a
credible threat of death or serious bodily harm to members of the school
community is one of those special dangers. 350 Students at school are a
“captive audience” 351 since their attendance at school is mandatory. 352 As
our nation’s recent experience makes plain, students sometimes are captive
victims of the deadly intentions of others. 353 In light of that grim reality,
603 & 620-23 (hereainfter “Gold Waldman”) (2011) (discussing the courts’ varied
rationales for imposing discipline on student speech that threatens school employees,
whether the speech originated on-campus or off-campus).
341
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
342
Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069-70.
343
Bell, 799 F.3d at 396.
344
It is not clear that the correct decision was reached in Bell. See, infra at n. ___.
345
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
346
Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
347
See Part I.D. supra.
348
Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
349
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
350
See., e.g., Gold Waldman, supra note 340, at 603 (detailing the psychological
effects experienced by school employees who were the targets of students’ violent
speech).
351
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
352
Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring) (“School attendance can expose
students to threats to their physical safety that they would not otherwise face.”).
353
142 School Shootings since Sandy Hook Massacre in Newtown, Conn, WASH.

36

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

[]

school officials must be able to act whenever faced with a credible threat
of serious bodily harm to any member of the school community.
The clearest means to give school officials the necessary authority
is to create a new category of unprotected student speech. Student violent
speech should not simply be folded into Tinker’s substantial disruption
standard, as was done in Wynar. 354 There are two advantages of de-linking
the threats of violence from the substantial disruption standard. One is that
it simply avoids the somewhat tortured linguistics of labelling a school
shooting as “disruptive.” School shootings are horrific events, not merely
“disruptive.” 355 Second, removing credible threats of violence from the
definition of a “substantial disruption” also will allow the Court to
separately describe the scope of a substantial disruption, thus giving
valuable guidance to school officials as to that separate category of
regulation over student speech.
Thus, the Court should find that student speech that school officials
reasonably believe is a credible threat of death or serious bodily harm to
any member of the school community is not protected under the First
Amendment. 356 Such student speech is subject to discipline regardless
where it was created or the means by which it was communicated to
school officials.
If the Court were to create such a category of unprotected student
speech, the Court should also clarify the contours of such a rule. In
particular, the Court should find that the inquiry is not whether the student
subjectively intended to threaten someone, but whether a reasonable
school official could objectively interpret the language as a threat. 357
On that issue, the Court must distinguish the student speech context
POST (Oct. 1 2015) (available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/1/142school-shootings-sandy-hook-massacre-newtown-c/) (last visited Sept. 27, 2016). Other
information
about
school-associated
violent
deaths
can
be
found
at
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/savd.html
(last
visited Sept. 27, 2016).
354
728 F.2d at 1069.
355
Id. at 1070 (“It is an understatement that the specter of a school shooting qualifies
… under Tinker.”).
356
This is a different rule than that proposed by July Jolly in his concurring opinion
in Bell. See Part II.E., supra. Judge Jolly proposed a three-element rule that required (a)
an actual threat to kill or physically harm personnel or students; (b) which is connected to
the school environment; and (c) is communicated to the school or its personnel or
students. 799 F.3d at 401. Judge Jolly’s rule contains limits that are not ideal. So, for
example, if a student’s threatening speech was communicated to someone who was not
another student or school personnel, the third element would not be satisfied.
357
See J.S., 569 Pa. at 655-56. In J.S., the student’s off-campus speech included a
picture of the teacher with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the student’s speech constituted a “true threat” that
was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. In so holding, the court applied an
objective reasonable person standard. Id. at 656, citing Interest of A.S., 243 Wis. 2d 173
(2001). However, some scholars take the position that school officials must determine the
student’s subjective intent as part of a true threat analysis. See, e.g., Mary Margaret
Roark, Elonis v. United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: Protecting Our EverShrinking First Amendment Rights in the New Era of Communication, 15 U. PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y. 197, 217 (2015).
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from its recent decision in United States v. Elonis358 and the federal cases
that have reached differing conclusions regarding the intent requirement in
the context of a “true threat” analysis. 359 In Elonis, the Court addressed
the issue whether criminal penalties could be imposed on an individual
who published threatening statements on the Internet without proof that the
defendant subjectively intended to make a threat. 360 The defendant in
Elonis, an adult male, had written several posts on Facebook expressing a
desire to harm others, including one post in which he stated: “I’m
checking out and making a name for myself/Enough elementary schools in
a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever
imagined.” 361 After being convicted of violating federal law that
criminalized any communication transmitted in interstate commerce that
contained “any threat to injure the person of another,” 362 the defendant
appealed his conviction on the ground that the government was required to
prove that he subjectively intended his postings to be threats. 363
The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that the
trial court had erred in instructing the jury that it need consider only
whether a reasonable person would regard the defendant’s postings as
threats. 364 The Court determined that the reasonable person standard
should not be applied to a criminal statute, reasoning that the imposition of
criminal sanctions requires some proof that the defendant was aware of his
or wrong doing. 365
By deciding the case on the more narrow issue whether the
particular criminal statute required proof of a subjective intent to threaten,
the Court avoided the constitutional question of the intent requirement
needed to establish that speech constituted a true threat. 366 Justice Thomas
authored a dissenting opinion in which he did consider the First
Amendment question. 367 To demonstrate the need for an objective
reasonable person standard, Justice Thomas invoked the circumstance of a
school shooting, stating:
[T]here is nothing absurd about punishing an individual
who, with knowledge of the words he uses and their
ordinary meaning in context, makes a threat. For instance,
a high-school student who sends a letter to his principal
stating that he will massacre his classmates with a machine
358

135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015).
See John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally
Protected Expression, 39 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y. 631, 652-56 (2016) (discussing
the “subjective-versus-objective question” that has divided the federal courts in analyzing
true threats).
360
Id. at 2007.
361
Id. at 2006.
362
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
363
135 S.Ct. at 2007.
364
Id. at 2012.
365
Id.
366
See Bell, 799 F.3d at 420-21 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (discussing Elonis).
367
135 S.Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
359
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gun, even if he intended the letter as a joke, cannot fairly
be described as engaging in innocent conduct. 368
Indeed, threats to cause harm in the school environment do require a
different analysis. Even if the Court correctly applied the subjective intent
standard in Elonis, a case involving a criminal statute, the school setting is
entirely different. First, any discipline meted out by school officials does
not criminalize behavior or impose criminal penalties. Thus, the use of a
reasonable person standard in terms of school discipline results in far less
consequences than it does in the criminal context. Second, one can well
imagine that many students whose speech is being considered as
threatening will claim that subjectively they intended only to make a
joke. 369 In some cases, establishing a student’s subjective intent could be
difficult. In light of the potential risks, the objective reasonable person
standard should be applied.
School officials have the enormous responsibility to ensure that all
students at school are safe and “secure.” 370 In order to fulfill their
responsibilities to all students who are compelled to attend school, the
proper standard in the school context is whether school officials
reasonably interpret the speech as a credible threat of death or serious
bodily harm.
The Court also could provide guidance as to what constitutes a
credible threat to cause death or serious bodily harm. The student’s speech
at issue in Wynar provides a good example of a credible threat. There the
student frequently posted messages on social media that, over a period of
months, grew ever more violent. 371 He specifically threatened to conduct a
school shooting on April 20, the anniversary of the Columbine shooting. 372
He described the type of gun and ammunition that he would use, noting
that he would “probly only kill the people I hate?/who hate me/then a few
random to get the record?” 373 The student’s speech alarmed the other
students with whom he had shared his posts to such an extent that they
contacted a school employee. 374 After viewing the student’s online
postings, the police were called and the student was taken into custody. 375
In contrast, a recent federal district court case provides an example
of speech that would not be viewed as a credible threat. In Burge v.
Colton School District, 376 a middle school student who was disciplined for
off-campus statements he had posted on social media filed suit alleging a
violation of his First Amendment rights. The student’s speech included
statements that he wanted “start a petition to get [his teacher] fired,” 377
368

Id.
See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1066.
370
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (students have a right “to be secure and to be let
alone.”).
371
728 F.3d at 1065.
372
Id.
373
Id.
374
Id. at 1066.
375
Id.
376
100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Ore. 2015).
377
Id. at 1060.
369
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that she was “the worst teacher ever,” 378 and that she was “just a bitch.” 379
After a friend responded “XD HAHAHAHA!!,” 380 the student wrote “Ya
haha she just needs to be shot.” 381
Although the student deleted the post within twenty-four hours
after posting it, another student had printed out a copy of the post and,
many weeks later, gave the printout to the school principal. 382 The
principal then determined to suspend the student from school and
thereafter the student filed suit. 383 The federal district court granted the
student’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the school district
had violated the student’s First Amendment rights. 384
The court determined that the student’s speech could not be
construed as a true threat to school safety under either a subjective or an
objective standard. 385 In so holding, the court noted that, after reading the
printout, school officials did not question the student or his parents about
access to guns, contact law enforcement, or seek a mental health
evaluation of the student. 386 School officials also did not remove the
student from the teacher’s classroom. 387 Rather, the student simply was
given a three-and-one-half day in-school suspension, which he served by
sitting in an office at school. 388 Thus, the court determined that the conduct
of school officials showed a lack of any reasonable belief that the speech
constituted a credible threat. 389
Given the serious issue of student threats of violence, it truly is
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Bell. First,
the Court could have articulated a clear category of unprotected student
off-campus speech. In addition, the Court could have outlined the
contours of that category. Arguably the Fifth Circuit erred in concluding
that Mr. Bell’s rap song was a threat. 390 The majority in Bell determined
that school personnel had been threatened even though, under the
measures outlined in Burge, no credible threat of violence had been made.
In Bell, school officials did not contact law enforcement. 391 On the first
378

Id.
Id.
380
Id. “XD” is a laughing emoticon. See http://slangit.com/meaning/xd (last visited
Sept. 28, 2016).
381
Id.
382
Id. at 1061.
383
Id.
384
Id. at 1060. The district judge adopted the report and recommendation of a
magistrate judge, who recommended that summary judgment be granted to the student on
his First Amendment claim and that summary judgment be granted to the school district
on a due process claim. Id.
385
Id. at 1068-71.
386
Id. at 1069.
387
Id.
388
Id. at 1064.
389
Id.; see also J.S., 569 Pa. at 656 (relevant factors in determining whether a
statement is a credible threat include how the recipient or other listeners reacted to the
threat, whether the threat was conditional, and whether the speaker had made similar
statements in the past).
390
799 F.3d at 429 (Dennis, J. dissenting).
391
Id.
379
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day that they discussed the rap song with Mr. Bell, the school principal
drove him home. 392 On the day that school officials suspended Mr. Bell,
they allowed him to remain unattended in the school commons for the rest
of day so that he could ride the bus home. 393 In addition, the disciplinary
committee determined that any threat contained in the rap song was
“vague.” 394 These important facts from the case indicate that school
officials did not interpret the rap song to be a credible threat of violence.
Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bell, the Court could
set constitutional guidelines for this important category of student speech.
In this regard, the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in Bell was a missed
opportunity to clarify students’ First Amendment rights in the digital age.
B. Tinker’s “Rights of Others” Prong Should Apply to Student-on-Student
Off-Campus Speech That Constitutes Bullying or Harassment.
The lower federal courts also need guidance as to the proper scope
of authority over student off-campus speech that constitutes bullying or
harassment. This is an issue that is of particular importance in the digital
age, since bullying using electronic means, also known as cyberbullying,
can be particularly vicious and harmful. 395 As to this form of student offcampus electronic speech, many scholars have advocated that the Supreme
Court extend school authority under Tinker’s “rights of others” prong. 396
Indeed, bullying or harassing speech seems to fit squarely within the rule
expressed in Tinker that one student’s speech should not interfere with the
“rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.” 397 Due to the
serious adverse consequences associated with student-on-student bullying
and harassment, no First Amendment protection should be afforded to
such speech, and school officials ought to have the authority to discipline
students for such speech regardless whether the speech was created outside
392

Id.
Id.
394
Id. at 385.
395
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572 (detailing the harmful effects of student-on-student
bullying). Due to a variety of factors, particularly the distance between bully and victim
that electronic communications provide, cyberbullying can be particularly vicious and
harmful. See Kevin Turbert, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 653-54 (2011) (detailing the harmful
effects of cyberbullying, particularly on adolescents); Gold Waldman, supra note 340, at
647-49 (detailing research on cyberspeech).
396
See, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Student Expression That Collides with the Rights of
Others: Should The Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone? 240 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 10
(2009) [Student Expression]; Martha McCarthy, Cyberbullying Law and First Amendment
Rulings: Can They Be Reconciled? 83 MISS. L.J. 804, 828 (2014) [Cyberbullying];
Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 553; Jon G. Crawford, When
Student Off-Campus Cyberspeech Permeates the Schoolhouse Gate: Are There Limits to
Tinker’s Reach? 45 URB. LAW. 235, 262 (2013) (“The Supreme Court should validate
the use of the Tinker second prong analysis as an independent analytical tool to be used in
student off-campus cyberspeech cases involving bullying and harassment.”); Stacie A.
Stewart, A Trade-Off That Becomes A Rip-Off: When Schools Can’t Regulate
Cyberbullying, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1645, 1660 (2013).
397
Id. at 508.
393
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of the school environment. I therefore join other scholars who advocate
that Tinker’s rights of others prong be applied to student-on-student
bullying or harassing speech.
Tinker obviously was decided in an age where students did not
harass or bully each other electronically; however, Tinker’s rationale,
namely that all students have to the right to be “let alone” 398 at school,
applies to off-campus bullying or harassing speech because the effects of
such speech are felt by the victim at school and impact the victim’s
educational rights. Thus, at the next opportunity, the Court should hold
that, under Tinker’s rights of others prong, a student who engages in
speech that bullies or harasses another student in violation of state antibullying legislation has no First Amendment protection. 399 Due to the
impact on the victim within the school environment, school officials are
authorized to impose discipline regardless where such speech is created.
In this category of bullying or harassing speech, there is another
issue that the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Bell brings to the forefront.
It is the issue whether student off-campus speech that targets a school
employee is entitled to First Amendment protection. In Bell, the Fifth
Circuit determined that school officials could discipline a student whose
off-campus speech threatened, harassed and intimidated a teacher if the
student intentionally directed the speech at the school community and
school officials could reasonably forecast a substantial disruption. 400 And
yet the majority in Bell stated, albeit in dicta, that a student’s off-campus
speech that threatens, harasses and intimidates a teacher arguably might
always “portend[] a substantial disruption, making feasible a per se rule in
that regard.” 401 The majority in Bell thus suggested that off-campus
student speech targeting a school official always is unprotected because the
forecast of a substantial disruption is per se reasonable and thus assumed.
Thus, Bell reinvigorates a debate that had been prompted in part by
the Third Circuit’s decisions in Layshock and Snyder, two cases in which
the students had created fake Internet profiles that ridiculed school
administrators. 402 In Snyder, six judges dissented from the ruling in favor
of the student primarily on the ground that the decision “left schools
defenseless to protect teachers and school officials” 403 from malicious
cyberattacks by students. Indeed, many scholars advocate that student offcampus speech that harasses a school employee should not be entitled to
First Amendment protection. 404 Still others argue that school authority
398

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
An important issue, which is beyond the scope of this article, is how to define
“bullying” or “harassment.” Some scholars assert that anti-bullying statutes contain
vague language that unconstitutionally restricts students’ First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyberbullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech, 59
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 118 (2011).
400
Id. at 396.
401
Id. at 397.
402
Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; Snyder, 650 F.3d 915.
403
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 941.
404
McCarthy, Cyberbullying, supra note 396, at 823 (suggesting that all student
electronic expression could be deemed to be in-school speech in order to allow discipline
for speech “directed towards school personnel and classmates”); Butler, supra note 41, at
399
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should not be extended to off-campus electronic speech that targets school
employees. 405 These scholars reason that, unlike students, the educational
rights of school employees are not implicated by off-campus electronic
speech that targets them. 406 In addition, school employees should be
“equipped emotionally and intellectually” to handle disrespectful or
harassing speech published by a student. 407 In addition, school employees
have the ability to impose discipline if such harassing speech is repeated at
school. They have the ability to pursue civil remedies against students
whose off-campus speech is defamatory or libelous.
While student-on-student bullying or harassment should not be
protected speech for the reasons stated above, student off-campus speech
that arguably bullies or harasses a school employee should not be subject
to school discipline. 408 Students have a First Amendment right to “express
disrespect and disdain for their teachers,” 409 including expressing their
views in vulgar terms if they wish. 410 Extending school authority to student
off-campus speech that arguably bullies or harasses a school employee
could impermissibly chill student speech. Students have the right to voice
criticism of school policies, procedures and personnel. There is a real
danger that school officials might “engag[e] in illegitimate censorship of
speech critical of their own actions rather than imposing discipline to
protect legitimate institutional interests.” 411
School officials could
overreach and violate a student’s constitutionally protected right to express
complaints about a teacher’s competence, classroom demeanor or other
302 (“Speech described as bullying, harassing, libelous, or threatening, it is directed at
other students or school personnel, is not protected speech ….”); Stewart, supra note
396, at 1658 (“The decisions in Layshock and J.S. are a rip-off to students and parents
because the bullying of school staff affects the ability of a school to provide a quality
education.”).
405
Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 552-53 (disparagement of
school personnel may have low disruptive impact); Christine Metteer Lorillard, When
Children’s Rights” Collide:” Free Speech v. The Right to Be Let Alone In The Context of
Off-Campus Cyberbullying, 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 259 n.487 (2011) (distinguishing between
student-on-student harassment and student-on-school employee harassment); Barry P.
McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 755 (2012)..
406
Lorillard, supra note 405, at 259 n.287.
407
Id., quoting Harper v. Poway Unifed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1183 (9th Cir.
2006).
408
Analytically it is not clear that Tinker’s rights of others prong does apply to
harassing or bullying speech that targets a school employee. The Court did refer to
speech that either “invad[es],” 393 U.S. at 513, or “collid[es] with,” Id., the rights of
others without specifically who the “others” might be. However, in at least one portion
of the opinion, the Court specifically referred only to the “rights of other students to be
secure and to be let alone.” Id. at 508. Thus, it is not clear the rights of others prong as
expressed in Tinker applies to school employees. See Philip T.K. Daniel, Bullying and
Cyberbullying In Schools: An Analysis of Student Free Expression, Zero Tolerance
Policies, and State Anti-Harassment Legislation, 268 EDUC. L. REP. 619, 632 (2011).
409
Bell, 799 F.3d at 425 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
410
Klein, 635 F. Supp. at 1442 (holding that school could not discipline a student for
“giving the finger” to a teacher he encountered in a restaurant parking lot, stating: “The
First Amendment protection of freedom of expression may not be made a casualty of the
effort to force-feed good manners to the ruffians among us”).
411
McDonald, supra note 405, at 728.
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qualities simply to assuage a co-worker’s hurt feelings. 412
The facts in Bell amply demonstrate this conundrum. If the
arguably threatening lyrics of Mr. Bell’s song are not considered, the
remainder of the song clearly ridiculed the coaches’ behavior (“drool
running down your mouth”), 413 called them names (“pervert,” “crazy”
and “lame”), 414 and denigrated a spouse’s appearance (“his wife ain’t got
no ti[tt]ies”), 415 among other comments. Yet Mr. Bell also made a
significant and substantive complaint that the coaches were sexually
harassing female students (“looking down girls shirts,” “fucking with the
students,” “rubbing on the black girls ears in the gym”). 416 Although the
majority in Bell deemed these statements to be harassment and
intimidation, one of the two coaches testified before the federal district
court that he considered Mr. Bell’s speech to be “just a rap song” and that
any issue about the song would “probably just die down” if he did not
draw attention to it. 417
Was the song harassing and intimidating, as opposed to merely
disrespectful? Does the issue turn on whether the targeted school employee
is upset? What about the fact that the student sought to publicize
inappropriate conduct by a school employee? Given all the potential that
students’ constitutionally protected rights to question and criticize the
conduct of school officials could be improperly curtailed, the Court should
not endorse a per se rule that students may be disciplined for off-campus
speech that harasses or bullies a school employee based solely on content
of the speech. 418
Declining to extend authority over student off-campus speech that
harasses or bullies a school employee does not leave school administrators
without recourse. If the off-campus speech enters the school environment
in such a way that a student either engages in lewd or indecent speech or
causes a substantial disruption, then school officials have clear authority to
impose discipline. 419 Indeed, school officials overwhelmingly prevail in
cases that challenge the authority to discipline students for vulgar or
disrespectful on-campus speech directed towards school employees. 420 That
412
There is also the additional question of how to define harassing or bullying speech
in this context in such a way that students’ free speech rights are not chilled. Only a
handful of state anti-bullying statutes apply to school personnel. Gold Waldman, supra
note 340, at 635.
413
799 F.3d at 384.
414
Id.
415
Id.
416
Id.
417
Id. at 429 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
418
Extending authority to allow discipline for off-campus electronic speech that
harasses or denigrates a teacher could encourage schools to engage in electronic
surveillance of students’ electronic communications. See, e.g., Emily F. Suski, Beyond
the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority
Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 63 (2014).
419
Fraser, 479 U.S. at 685; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. Student on-campus speech that
upsets a “civil and respectful atmosphere towards teachers” constitutes a substantial
disruption. Requa v. Kent, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
420
Gold Waldman, supra note 340, at 617 (noting that students generally lose cases
in which they challenged disciplinary action taken with respect to hostile or disrespectful
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disciplinary authority would extend to any student who, although not the
original author of the speech, repeats the contents of the off-campus
speech because the second student has engaged in speech within the school
environment.
In addition, any direct electronic communications between a
student and a school employee should be deemed to be “in-school”
speech. As Judge Smith correctly noted in his concurring opinion in
Snyder, a different analysis should apply where a student “send[s] a
disruptive email to school faculty from his home computer.” 421 Students
increasingly communicate electronically with school employees as part of
their coursework. Those direct student-to-school communications are not
out-of-school communications simply because the student is not physically
at school. Rather, the student is acting “qua student” 422 and any speech in
that context would be subject to discipline under the Supreme Court’s
existing precedents. 423 Specifically, electronic communications between a
student and a school employee is speech that, per Morse, is uttered in a
“school-sanctioned and school-supervised” setting. 424 If the speech is
lewd, indecent or offensive, it is subject to discipline under Fraser. If it
creates a substantial disruption – e.g., the student’s speech is
communicated to the entire class via email and causes a distraction – then
it is subject to discipline under Tinker.
Finally, school officials and the targeted employee have other tools
at their disposal. Although school may not be able to discipline the
student purely on the basis of off-campus speech, school officials who
become aware of such speech can inform the student that his or her speech
has been seen by school officials and that the student will be subject to
discipline if the speech impacts the school environment. 425 School officials
also can bring the student’s speech to the attention of the student’s parents.
Finally, if the particular school employee finds the speech to be libelous or
defamatory, the employee could avail himself or herself of civil
remedies. 426
speech directed to school employees).
421
650 F.3d at 940.
422
Bell, 799 F.3d at 389.
423
Morse, 551 U.S. at 396.
424
Id.; see also Susan Bendlin, Far From the Classroom, the Cafeteria and the
Playing Field: Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech Made In A
Student’s Bedroom, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 241 (2011) “The Supreme Court has
already made it clear in Morse then when the activity was school-approved, attended by
students, and supervised by school administrators and teacher, a student’s speech could
be regulated there even though he was literally standing off campus and not inside the
schoolhouse gate.”).
425
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705,
727 (2012). Indeed, school officials would have the opportunity to teach an important
lesson about our democracy. See Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the Teachable
Moment and Undermining the Future of the First Amendment – TISNF!, 60 CASE
WESTERN RES. L. REV. 153, 200 (2009).
426
See Alexander Tuneski, Online, Not Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech,
89 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (2009) (discussing potential civil remedies); Backus, supra note
425 at 187 (noting that a school employee successfully sued a student and his parents for
injuries resulting from the student’s off-campus expression).
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C. Tinker’s Substantial Disruption Standard Should Apply to A Student’s
Off-Campus Speech Only When An Actual Disruption Has Occurred.
To date, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Wynar, all of the circuit courts that have imposed discipline for students’
off-campus electronic speech have imposed a threshold test must be
satisfied before analyzing the speech under Tinker. In the Second, Fourth
and Eighth Circuits, the threshold test is a “reasonable foreseeability”
test. 427 The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Bell set forth an “intentional
direction” threshold test that is similar to the one proposed by Judge Smith
in his concurring opinion in Snyder. 428 For the following reasons, none of
these threshold tests should be adopted by the Court.
Some scholars have expressed approval of the Second Circuit’s
“reasonable foreseeability” test as appropriately balancing the First
Amendment rights of students and the authority of school officials to
maintain a proper school environment. 429 These scholars believe that a
“two-tiered” 430 inquiry under which school officials must first determine
the reasonable foreseeability that a student’s speech would reach school is
a “more conservative approach” 431 that provides greater protection to
students’ First Amendment rights, essentially because there is a threshold
inquiry before Tinker’s substantial disruption standard is applied. 432
However, Judge Smith noted in Snyder, such a standard easily can
be “stretched too far” 433 and thus “risk ensnaring any off-campus
expression that happened to discuss school-related matters.” 434 Most forms
of digital speech, whether a public posting on the Internet435 or a private
text message sent to just one other person, can be preserved and later
shown to others. Thus, it is hard to conceptualize any form of digital
expression that could not somehow come to the attention of school
officials. Indeed, it is surely true that the students in Layshock and Snyder
School boards would not incur any liability in an action filed by an employee who
was the target of a student’s off-campus speech if the Court were clear that such offcampus speech is protected under the First Amendment. Gold Waldman, supra note340,
at 634.
427
Although the Kowalski decision has been interpreted by some as creating a
“nexus” test, the Fourth Circuit did not state that it was adopting a “nexus” test, nor did
it outline the elements or factors that comprise such a test. See Part II.C., supra.
428
650 F.3d at 940.
429
Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 551-52, citing Paul Easton,
Splitting the Difference: Layshock and J.S. Chart A Different Path on Student Speech
Rights, 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. 17 (2012).
430
Id. at 551.
431
Id. at 551-52.
432
Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068.
433
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940.
434
Id.; see also Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing
Principals, Teachers & Classmates In Cyberspace, 7 F IRST. AM. L. REV. 210, 251
(2009) (“[A]n approach like that adopted by the Second Circuit that relies solely on
whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the question in question will come to the
attention of school authorities give schools sweeping off-campus jurisdictional power.”).
435
A Facebook post, for example.
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did not foresee that the disparaging MySpace profiles they created would
come to the attention of their school principals. If just one student shares
what was intended to be a private communications, school officials will
have become aware of the off-campus speech. 436 Thus, the reasonable
foreseeability standard seems to provide very little protection to
students. 437
In addition, the type of student off-campus electronic speech that
most likely would come to the attention of school authorities would be
speech relating to school events or individuals. By providing such a low
threshold for the imposition of school discipline, the reasonable
foreseeability test unduly constricts students’ ability to engage in free
speech about an important and predominant aspect of their lives: school. 438
Students would have very limited First Amendment rights if, in speaking
about school matters while not at school, they must restrict the audience to
such an extent that it would be unreasonable for their speech would come
to the attention of school authorities.
The “intentional direction” language used by the Fifth Circuit in
Bell might, at first glance, appear to set a higher threshold because it
would require some the student had directed speech into the school
environment. 439 However, it suffers from essentially the same defects as
the “reasonable foreseeability” test. Again, the threshold for imposition of
authority is quite low if a student’s “intentional direction” is determined
by the extent to which the student spoke on a matter of interest to the
school community and intended that other students would consider the
speech. 440 As with the reasonable foreseeability test, it seems that students
would essentially have no protection if they sought to speak about a matter
in any way related to school and they wanted their speech to reach
others. 441 In addition, the intentional direction test has the added difficulty
650 F.3d at 921 (a student who was in the principal’s office due to an “unrelated
incident” told the principal about the parody profile).
437
See Bendlin, supra, note 424, at 221-22 (“[U]nder the foreseeability test … it is
hard to know in advance how or when an Internet message might be printed out or
brought on to the campus (in some form) by someone other than the student-speaker. The
problem with vague standards is that neither school officials nor students know exactly
what the rules are.”).
438
Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus
Punishment, 85 INDIANA L.J. 1113, 1128 (2010) (“The Second Circuit’s broad
construction of the “reasonable foreseeability” test thus suggests that schools may possess
jurisdiction over virtually all student Internet speech that relates to school issues and tries
to galvanize student action”).
439
See e.g., David A. Polsinelli, Untangling the Web: A More Guided Approach To
Student Speech on the Internet, 54 S. TEXAS. L. REV. 779, 807-08 (2013); Lindsay J.
Gower, Blue Mountain School District v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder: Will the Supreme Court
Provide Clarifications For Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus Internet
Speech?64 ALA. L. REV. 709, 730 (2013) (arguing in favor of a “purposeful direction”
standard as superior to a foreseeability test).
440
Bell, 799 F.3d at 386 & 394 (finding that Mr. Bell intentionally directed his rap
song at the school community, presumably because of his apparent admissions that he
wanted to bring awareness to the coaches’ conduct and he knew students would listen to
the song.).
441
Id. at 418 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (deeming the majority’s intentional direction
inquiry to be incurably ambiguous).
436
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of asking school officials to determine the subjective “intent” of a student
before imposing discipline. 442
The better rule is to not have any threshold tests. With the
exception of speech constituting threats of violence or student-on-student
bullying, as discussed above, 443 school officials should authority to impose
discipline only when the student’s off-campus speech actually causes a
substantial disruption at school. In other words, student speech, no matter
where it is created, that causes an actual substantial disruption within the
school environment should be subject to discipline. 444 If a student’s speech
actually disrupts the school environment, the student should not be
shielded from discipline by the excuse that the speech was created off
campus. Given the prevalence of electronic communications and easy
access to such communications even in the school environment, the offcampus electronic nature of the communications should not be relevant to
the inquiry. The issue should be solely whether the student’s speech
caused a substantial disruption in the school environment. Thus, Tinker
should apply even without the necessity of some threshold test.
However, expressly applying Tinker to student off-campus
electronic speech is not the end of the inquiry. If the Court applied Tinker
to student off-campus speech, then the Court would need to define the
word “substantial.” In that regard, it is relevant that, even with evidence
in Tinker that a mathematics class had been “practically ‘wrecked’ chiefly
by disputes,” 445 the Court found no substantial disruption. 446 A substantial
disruption should be something much more than “general rumblings” 447
among students, “minor inconveniences” to school personnel, or limited
distractions from classwork. 448 Rather, a substantial disruption would
require “boisterous conduct, interruption of classes, or [a] lack of order,
discipline or decorum at the school.” 449
In addition to defining when a disruption is substantial, the Court
also would have to address the issue of causation. In his concurring
opinion in Snyder, Judge Smith indirectly raised this issue by describing a
scenario in which student, outside of school hours, posted a defense of gay
442
Benjamin Ellison, More Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech With
On-Campus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 809, 836 (2010) (“Subjective intent can be
difficult to determine”).
443
See Parts III.A. and III.B., supra.
444
Bendlin, supra note 424, at 222.
445
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
446
Id. at 508 (“There is no indication that the work of the schools or any class was
disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children
wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.”).
447
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 922.
448
Snyder, 593 F.3d at 299.
449
Bell, 774 F.3d at 296. School officials sometimes are wildly off-based in their
own judgment that a substantial disruption has occurred as school See, e.g., T.V. ex. rel.
B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (the
court ruled that a school district had violated the First Amendment rights of two high
school students who posted provocative photos of themselves over the summer vacation,
finding that “two complaints from parents and some petty sniping among a group of 15
and 16 year olds … can’t be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it enunciated the
‘substantial disruption’ standard in Tinker.”).
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marriage on a blog to which other students had a negative reaction. 450 He
hypothesized that classmates who opposed gay marriage might, in reacting
to the speech, cause a substantial disruption at school. 451 Judge Smith
determined that, if Tinker were to apply to off-campus electronic speech,
the student who posted the blog entry could be subject to discipline. 452
In Judge Smith’s hypothetical, the student who posts the blog
should not be subject to discipline simply because there is a failure of
causation. Except in very limited circumstances, 453 speech that provokes a
reaction in others who might show their disagreement by causing a
disruption does not make the speaker responsible for the audience’s
actions. In the hypothetical posed by Judge Smith, the student in favor of
gay marriage would not have caused a disruption. Rather, the students
who would have voiced their opposition at school would be the cause of
any substantial disruption.
Such a rule might be difficult to follow sometimes. Students might
engage in off-campus, such as racist comments, that could provoke strong
reactions. 454 However, in our democracy, even speech that many citizens
would find “shabby, offensive, or even ugly” is entitled to First
Amendment protection. 455 When faced with such speech, students could
learn a valuable civics lesson about fundamental values of our democracy
and the ways in which others have responded to hateful or disturbing
language or conduct. 456 Such a result would be a valuable addition to our
students’ education.
D. As to a Forecast of a Substantial Disruption, School Officials Should
Not Be Able To Discipline Students For Their Off-Campus Speech.
Finally, the Court also should determine that, as to off-campus
speech, school officials may not impose discipline based on nothing more
than a “reasonable forecast” 457 of a future substantial disruption. Again,
this rule would be applicable only if the Court also determined that student
off-campus electronic speech is not protected when (a) the speech is a
credible threat of violence against any member of the school
community; 458 or (b) it bullies or harasses another student. 459 With those
two rules in place, student off-campus speech generally should not be

450

650 F.3d at 939.
Id.
452
Id.
453
While the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
established that “fighting words” are not protected under the First Amendment because
their effect on listeners, the Court’s recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443
(2011) greatly limit the applicability of that doctrine.
454
Lee’s Summit, 696 F.3d 771.
455
Bell, 799 F.3d at 426 (Dennis, J., dissenting)., quoting United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000).
456
Backus, supra note 425, at 200.
457
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
458
See Part III.A., supra.
459
See Part III.B., supra.
451
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subject to discipline based on a potential future disruption. 460
School authority over off-campus speech should be limited to
discipline for actual, not forecasted disruptions, because of the risk that
school officials will overzealously predict disruptions. In his dissent in
Bell, Judge Dennis aptly described the difficulty of forecasting future
disruptions, stating:
If this standard were applied off campus, how can a student
or a student’s parents know with any degree of certainty
when off-campus online speech can be “forecasted” to
cause a “substantial disruption”? Although Tinker is not a
completely toothless standard, … its framework inherently
requires guesswork about how a third-party school official
will prophesize over the effect of speech. 461
Judge Dennis is right. Students’ constitutional right to speak freely
when they are not at school should not be subject to second-guessing by a
school official about the potential future impact on the school
environment. Rather, other than violent or student-on-student bullying
speech, school officials simply should not be able to impose discipline for
off-campus speech without concrete evidence that the speech actually
impacted the school environment. Constitutional rights should not depend
on the extent to which a particular school official undertakes a crystal ball
inquiry about the potential future effect of a student’s off-campus
speech. 462 Indeed, the vagueness of the standard would allow school
officials to conjure up reasons why student off-campus speech that they
find distasteful, perhaps because they do not like the language463 or the
images464 that appear in the student’s off-campus speech.
CONCLUSION

460
Denying school officials the authority to discipline students for off-campus
electronic speech on the basis of a potential future disruption is not the same
constitutional analysis as allowing school officials the authority to prohibit students from
wearing clothing that displays or represents a point of view (e.g., the Confederate flag) in
order to avoid future disruptions. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unif. Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that school officials could prohibit students from
wearing clothing bearing the symbol of the American flag on Cinco de Mayo).
461
Bell, 799 F.3d at 418-19.
462
For a review of cases that address the reasonableness of a forecast of future
substantial disruption caused by students’ off-campus electronic speech, see Samantha M.
Levin, School Districts as Weathermen: The School’s Ability to Reasonably Forecast
Substantial Disruption to the School Environment from Students’ Online Speech, 38
F ORDHAM URB. L.J.859 (2011).
463
See Bell, 799 F.3d at 429 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting that, in the preliminaryinjunction hearing, the school board’s lawyer characterized Mr. Bell’s rap song as
“filthy”).
464
T.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (school district could not reasonably foresee a
future disruption arising from sexually suggestive photos that had been posted by two
high school students over summer vacation).
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Both the lower federal courts and school officials need Supreme
Court guidance on all of the important First Amendment considerations
that are implicated by students’ off-campus electronic speech. By denying
certiorari in Bell, the Court missed an outstanding opportunity to provide
that necessary guidance. Given the facts in Bell, the Court could have
provided guidance regarding speech that arguably threatens violence in the
school setting or arguably harasses or bullies others. The Court also could
have clarified important aspects of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.
While the decision not to grant certiorari in Bell represents a missed
opportunity to clarify students’ First Amendment rights in the digital age,
the lower federal courts and school officials alike can hope that, in the
near future, the Court will provide the needed guidance.

